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Abstract
The model presented here is a New estimated medium-scale Multi-Country Model (NMCM) which
covers the ￿ve largest euro area countries and is used for forecasting and scenarios analysis at the
European Central Bank. The model has a tight theoretical structure which allows for non-unitary
elasticity of substitution, non-constant augmenting technical progress and heterogeneous sectors
with di⁄erentiated price and income elastiticites of demand across sectors. Furthermore, it has the
explicit inclusion of expectations on the basis of three optimising private sector decision making
units: i.e. ￿rms, trade unions and households, where output is in the short run demand-determined
and monopolistically competing ￿rms set prices and factor demands. Labour is indivisible and
monopoly-unions set wages and households make consumption/saving decisions.
We assume agents optimise under limited information where each agent knows only the pa-
rameters related to his/her optimization problem. Therefore we estimate with GMM, which
implicitly assumes limited information boundedly rational expectations. In this paper we pro-
vide some simulation results under the assumption of model-consistent rational expectations, we
show that there is some heterogeneity across countries and that the reactions of the economies
to shocks depends strongly on whether the shocks are pre-announced, announced and credible or
unannounced and uncredible.
Keywords: Macro model, Open-economy macroeconomics, Rational expectations
JEL Classi￿cation: C51, C6, E55
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Non technical summary
The model presented here is a new estimated medium-scale Multi-Country Model (NMCM) which
covers the 5 largest euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) and can
be used either on a single country basis or as a linked euro area multi-country model. The model is
the main macroeconomic tool used to build the European Central Bank sta⁄projections for individual
euro area countries in the context of the Eurosystem Macroeconomic Projection exercises (see ECB
2001). Given the need by central bankers to analyse the interaction of a large set of variables in the
economy, small models, by their nature, have limited policy use. Therefore, we have aimed to build
a model with both economic coherence, that matches the key characteristics of the data and that is
useful to build projections and to analyse policy issues via scenario analysis. The NMCM will enable
us to analyse cross-country interaction of ￿scal, monetary, and competitiveness issues, just to name a
few of the possibilities.
The model has ￿rm micro-economic foundations with the theoretic core of the model containing one
exportable domestic good and one imported good. All central behavioural relations are based on the
optimisation behaviour of three private sector decision making units (i.e. households, labour unions
and ￿rms) and the reaction functions of the government sector and the central bank. Expectation
formation is treated explicitly and the model can be characterised as a micro-founded New Keynesian
model. Although in all these respects the NMCM closely resembles DSGE models, its di⁄erences
to them are also clear, especially, in the following two ways. Firstly, the model is speci￿ed to track
both the short-run dynamics around the medium-run equilibrium and also the deviations of the
medium-run developments from the balanced-growth-path. This is executed by a careful modelling of
the supply-side allowing non-unitary elasticity of substitution between labour and capital and quite
general factor augmenting technical progress accounting for cross-equation restrictions. Secondly, the
DSGE assumption that all optimizing agents know fully the whole structure and all parameter values
of the model including the stochastic processes generating exogenous shocks is replaced by bounded
rationality. Thus, each agent knows only the parameters related to her optimization problem but
does not need to know the rest of the model, i.e. other agent￿ s optimising problems, nor, more
importantly, the stochastic processes driving the variables predetermined to them. This modelling
strategy allows the use of the model under rational expectations and to ￿ exibly vary the degree
at which the exact stochastic nature of the shock is correctly anticipated, as well as to extend the
framework further to account for boundedly rational learning, where the true stochastic nature of the
shock is gradually learned. However, we reserve the detailed presentation of this important extension
for an accompanying separate report, see Dieppe et. al (2011).
Our modelling approach has been, within the constraints of the common theoretic setting, to
allow the data to determine estimated parameter values, with only a limited amount of constraints.
Therefore, we estimate the supply side by non-linear SUR which allows for cross-equation restrictions
in the medium-run, and the dynamic equations are estimated by GMM, which implicitly assumes
limited information bounded rational expectations.
Our indicative simulations are undertaken with agents￿expectations based on rational, model
consistent expectations. These simulations suggest the impulse responses of the model to exogenous
shocks are plausible with cross-country di⁄erences re￿ ecting estimated country heterogeneity. Fur-
thermore, under our framework, the reaction of the economy to shocks depends strongly on whether
it is pre-announced and/or correctly anticipated (perfectly informed), or unannounced and uncredible
(imperfectly informed). With forward-looking rational expectations model responses to shocks are
quick and the model solution converges fast to the long-run equilibrium. However, the shock response
e⁄ects become more delayed and comparable to those in many DSGE models, if the shock generating
processes are speci￿ed to follow some simple AR process, as it is the practice in the DSGE models.6
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1 Introduction
The model presented here is a New estimated medium-scale Multi-Country Model (NMCM) developed
at the European Central Bank. It covers the 5 biggest euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy,
Spain and the Netherlands) and can be used either on a single country basis or as a linked euro area
multi-country model. This model is the main country macroeconomic tool used at the ECB in the
context of the Eurosystem Macroeconomic Projection exercises (see ECB 2001). Given the need by
central bankers to analyse the interaction of a large set of variables in the economy, small models, by
their nature, have limited policy use. Therefore, we have aimed to build a model with both economic
coherence, that matches the key characteristics of the data and that is useful to build projections and
to analyse policy issues via scenario analysis. The NMCM will enable us to analyse cross-country
interaction of ￿scal, monetary, and competitiveness issues, just to name a few of the possibilities.
The model has ￿rm micro-economic foundations with the theoretic core of the model containing one
exportable domestic good and one imported good. All central behavioural relations are based on the
optimisation behaviour of three private sector decision making units (i.e. households, labour unions
and ￿rms) and the reaction functions of the government sector and the central bank. Expectation
formation is treated explicitly and the model can be characterised as a micro-founded New Keynesian
model. Although in all these respects the NMCM closely resembles DSGE models, its di⁄erences
to them are also clear, especially, in the following two ways. Firstly, the model is speci￿ed to track
both the short-run dynamics around the medium-run equilibrium and also the deviations of the
medium-run developments from the balanced-growth-path. This is executed by a careful modelling of
the supply-side allowing non-unitary elasticity of substitution between labour and capital and quite
general factor augmenting technical progress accounting for cross-equation restrictions. Secondly, the
DSGE assumption that all optimizing agents know fully the whole structure and all parameter values
of the model including the stochastic processes generating exogenous shocks is replaced by bounded
rationality. Thus, each agent knows only the parameters related to her optimization problem but does
not need to know the rest of the model, i.e. other agent￿ s optimising problems, nor, more importantly,
the stochastic processes driving the variables predetermined to them. This modelling strategy allows
the use of the model under rational expectations and to ￿ exibly vary the degree at which the exact
stochastic nature of the shock is correctly anticipated, as well as the use of the model under boundedly
rational learning, where the true stochastic nature of the shock is gradually learned.
Our modelling approach has been, within the constraints of the common theoretic setting, to
allow the data to determine estimated parameter values, with only a limited amount of constraints.
Therefore, we estimate the supply side by non-linear SUR which allows for cross-equation restrictions
in the medium-run, and the dynamic equations are estimated by GMM, which implicitly assumes
limited information bounded rational expectations.
This report is the ￿rst in the series of reports presenting the NMCM. It presents the common
theoretical structure of individual country blocks, their estimation and the simulation properties of
each country block on a single county basis under rational model consistent expectations. The second
report will present the boundedly rational learning version of the model and studies the behaviour
of the model under alternative assumptions concerning expectation formation. The third report will
present the linked NMCM model which includes a sixth block covering the rest of the euro area and
studies the model properties under the common monetary and exchange rate policy and compares
them to the simulation results done on a single country basis.6 7
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2 Overview of the Model Framework
This section gives a concise overview of the main features of the theoretical model. The detailed
theoretical framework and the derivation of the estimated speci￿cations are presented in the following
sections.
The theoretical core of the model consists of three optimising private sector decision making units,
namely utility maximising households, pro￿t maximising ￿rms and trade unions. Monopolistically
competing ￿rms set prices, inventories, ￿xed investment and employment under the assumptions of
indivisible labour. Output is in the short run demand-determined. Overlapping generation households
make consumption/saving decisions and monopoly unions set wages by minimising the quadratic loss
function under the staggered wage adjustment assumption. There are two types of trade unions:
utilitarian and non-utilitarian. In a right-to-manage framework, the utilitarian unions maximize the
member households￿utility allowing the employment rate to vary. The non-utilitarian unions target
the employment rate via real wage demands. The share of utilitarian and non-utilitarian unions can
be ￿ exibly changed, depending for instance on the purpose of the simulation exercise. This is useful for
model diagnosis because a non-utilitarian trade union alternative implies a constant long-run NAIRU,
while the utilitarian alternative implies that the NAIRU reacts to permanent shocks. In addition, the
utilitarian union alternative renders the model suitable for welfare analysis of economic policy.
As the available data do not disaggregate government into separate institutional sectors, the the-
oretical core of the model assumes a single domestic good produced by an aggregated production
function with total employment and total capital stock as inputs. Hence, the optimisation framework
derives the ￿true￿behavioural relations for total employment, investment, private consumption and
corresponding de￿ ators and factor prices. For forecasting purpose, however, the accounting frame-
work of the model is markedly more disaggregated, but with no feed-back e⁄ects on the longer-run
adjustment dynamics of the model.
The real world data which we have to confront stands in stark contrast to the predictions of
many simple macroeconomic models. In particular, a simple model with a balanced growth path
(BGP), as typically adopted e.g. by DSGE and other models related to the real business cycle (RBC)
paradigm, would predict that the GDP-shares of capital, labour and total factor income as well as
the capital-output ratio are stationary. In the real data for our ￿ve countries this is clearly not
the case. Therefore, as discussed by McAdam and Willman (2008), Solow (2000) and Blanchard
(1997), we adopt a medium-run view regarding the underlying ￿trend￿ developments of our data
in the sample period. Accordingly, the medium run developments, towards which the short-run
dynamics converges, are allowed to deviate from the BGP. However, this view does not exclude the
possibility that many processes, which from a medium run perspective may be advisable to treat as
exogenous, are from the very long-run perspective endogenous and drive the medium run development
eventually to converge to the BGP. Acemoglu (2002, 2003) gives an excellent example by showing
that while technical progress is necessarily labour-augmented along the BGP, it may become capital-
augmented in periods of transition re￿ ecting the interplay of innovation activities, factor intensities
and pro￿tability. Given a below-unitary substitution elasticity, this pattern promotes the asymptotic
stability of income shares while allowing them to ￿ uctuate in the medium run. Accordingly, we allow
non-unitary elasticity of substitution, non-constant augmenting technical progress and heterogeneous
sectors with di⁄erentiated price and income elasticities of demand across sectors. We achieve this
following McAdam and Willman (2008 and 2010), by assuming a normalised Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) production function and augmented technical progress modelled in terms of Box-
Cox functions (Box and Cox (1964)). The assumption of heterogeneous sectors, in turn, allows a
non-stationary aggregate mark-up that can also be observed in the data.8
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In addition to the relaxations concerning the medium-run development, the optimisation frame-
works of agents contain a lot of frictional elements which are needed to explain realistically the observed
stylised short-run features. Labour is indivisible with important implications for the behaviour of op-
timising agents. Regarding households￿utility maximisation problem, the indivisibility assumption
simpli￿es the analysis, because the labour supply adjusts to the demand for labour conditional on
the wage contract set by unions maximising either the utility of member households or targeting the
warranted wage rate consistent with a desired employment rate. The basic framework in household￿ s
utility maximisation is Blanchard￿ s (1985) overlapping generation framework of perpetual youth that
implies that the discount rate of the optimizing households is modi￿ed to include the probability
of dying. This framework is especially useful in a small-open economy environment as it su¢ ces to
ensure that agents do not borrow inde￿nitely at the ￿xed external rate of interest. Hence, the long
run stability of foreign assets is attained without resorting to the somewhat ad-hoc assumption of the
foreign debt elastic interest rate or the endogenous discount factor, as is typically postulated in the
in￿nite horizon DSGE models, see more closely Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2003). We extend Blan-
chard￿ s overlapping generations framework in many ways with the ￿nal aim to improve its ability to
trace the observed hump-shaped response pattern of consumption to shocks. Firstly we incorporate
income uncertainty into the utility maximization framework. To do it in a tractable way, we apply a
two-stage approach, see Willman (2007). In the ￿rst stage, the consumer evaluates her risk-adjusted
non-human and human wealth conditional on uncertain lifespan and labour income. Thereafter, in
the second stage, conditional on the risk adjusted life-time resource constraint, the consumer is as-
sumed to determine her optimal planned path of consumption. This approach gives a closed form
consumption function with precautionary saving depending positively on the income risk and death
probability. The explicit treatment of wealth allows us also to account for asset price (i.e. stock and
house prices) e⁄ects on the perceived wealth relevant for consumption decisions. Further, the as-
sumption of imperfect-front loaded information on future income realisations changes also the weight
structure in de￿ning the present value of the expected income stream to be more front-loaded and
increases the dependency of consumption on current income. Hence, we do not need to split house-
holds arti￿cially into Ricardian utility maximisers and non-optimising income-constrained consumers
to introduce the observed strong dependency of consumption on current income. Instead, all con-
sumers are non-Ricardian utility maximisers. Finally, the assumption of habit persistency introduces
the dependency of current consumption on lagged consumption and is able to generate a hump-shaped
response pro￿le of consumption to shocks.
In the pro￿t maximising framework of the ￿rm the assumptions of indivisible labour, adjustment
costs with respect to number of workers and convex costs with respect to work intensity introduce
the discrepancy between paid hours and e¢ cient hours. This explains the observed pro-cyclicality in
labour productivity, when labour input is measured in heads or paid hours. It also introduces the
ratio of e¢ cient hours (per worker) to normal hours into an argument of optimal price setting on top
of the conventionally de￿ned marginal cost of labour. The price setting of ￿rms and the wage setting
of unions are staggered with three-valued Calvo-signal, McAdam and Willman (2010). Part of ￿rms
(unions) keep prices (wages) ￿xed, another part changes prices (wages) following backward-looking
rule and the rest set them optimally based on intertemporal optimization.
To capture the observed inertia in capital formation, capital stock and its rate of change are coupled
with adjustment costs. Also the ceiling to debt-￿nancing ratio and the irreversibility of investment
are imposed with implications for the rate at which the future is discounted and for the sensitivity
of investment with respect to the user cost. Regarding the stock formation, ￿rms minimise quadratic
losses induced by the deviations of inventories, on the one hand, and production, on the other hand,
from their respective target levels related to the level of production implied by the production function,9
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when existing inputs are utilised at their normal (cost minimising) rates.
The steady state form of the ￿rst-order conditions of pro￿t maximising ￿rms and the utility of
member households maximising unions imply the 5-equation medium-run supply system that allows a
consistent two-step estimation of the underlying deep parameters of the model. As the supply system
contains cross-equation parameter constrains, it is estimated with the method of non-linear SUR that
Le￿n-Ledesma et al. (2010) have proven to be a very e¢ cient estimation approach outperforming
all single-equation methods. This system de￿nes all parameters related to technology, production
function and the mark-up, allowing to de￿ne optimal frictionless prices, wages, labour input, marginal
cost and marginal product concepts needed in estimating in the second stage the dynamic ￿rst order
optimisation conditions of ￿rms and unions.
All dynamic equations containing the leads of variables are estimated by the generalised method
of moment (GMM) that is compatible with the assumption of bounded rationality.
All euro area countries are open economies and, therefore, also in our theoretic single domestic good
framework, a part of output is exported. However, ￿rms face separate demand functions in domestic
and export markets leading to the pricing to market behaviour. This e⁄ectively separates the optimal
price setting of exports from the rest of the ￿rm￿ s optimisation problem. We assume that the volume
of exports is determined by the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) function. The advantage of this
functional form compared to the conventional iso-elastic form is that now, compatibly with empirical
evidence, the foreign competitors￿price a⁄ect optimal export-price setting. The export demand and
the optimal price setting result in a two-equation system with cross-equation parameter constraints.
This allows a model consistent way to estimate the price elasticity of export demand. Import side
of the model is more conventional being determined by domestic demand and the relative price of
imports to domestic good.
In the following sections we go into more detail on the framework of the model, starting with
consumer behaviour in section 3, then ￿rm and union behaviour in sections 4 and 5 before turning to
the foreign trade block in section 6. Finally we specify the production function and the medium-run
supply system in section 7. Those who want to skip the derivation can go directly to section 8 where
we provide the estimates of the key equations in the model.
3 Consumer behaviour
Following Willman (2007) we derive a solved-out forward-looking aggregate consumption function
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences that is able to capture precautionary saving
as a response to income uncertainty. Although, this consumption function is derived in a uni￿ed opti-
mization framework, it results in non-Ricardian behaviour without dividing consumers into optimizing
and non-optimizing sub-groups.
We assume that in the mental frames of consumers the optimization problem is solved sequentially
rather than simultaneously, which is an implicit assumption in the dynamic programming approach1.
This assumption is needed to have a closed form solution. In the ￿rst stage the consumer is assumed
to evaluate her risk-adjusted non-human and human wealth conditional on uncertain lifespan and
labour income. Thereafter, in the second stage, conditional on the risk adjusted life-time resource
constraint, the consumer determines her optimal planned path of consumption.2
1The sequential approach to the consumer￿ s optimization problem can also be thought as a simplifying rule in line
with bounded rationality. For instance, Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Akerlof (2002), Thaler (1994, 2000) and Gabaix and
Laibson (2000) have argued that, rather than being fully rational, agents may use nearly rational decision strategies
summarising information and making choices based on simpli￿ed mental frames.
2A familiar example of sequential approach elsewhere in economics is the analysis of the portfolio selection problem,10
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The second key assumption concerns the information that consumers have on future income in-
novations. More explicitly, we assume that the amount of period-speci￿c information is front-loaded
so that, with the lengthening of the projection horizon, expected income changes converge to those
implied by some stochastic time-series process, which for simplicity is assumed to be a random walk.
Furthermore, we connect this framework to Blanchard￿ s (1985) overlapping generation model with
the positive probability of death and complement it to include habit formation. Habit formation is the
way our framework accounts for the observed excess sensitivity of aggregate consumption with respect
to lagged information. After aggregating, we end up with a dynamic consumption function where
current consumption depends on one period lead and lag of consumption as well as on fundamental
variables, i.e. on real non-human wealth, current-period real labour income and the real interest
rate as well as on the determinants of time-varying precautionary saving. In the following sections
we discuss the e⁄ects of income uncertainty, front-loaded information and habit persistence on the
life-time budget constraint and then derive the solved-out aggregate consumption function.
3.1 The life-time budget constraint under uncertain life-time, uncertain
labour income and front loaded information
In this section we derive the risk adjusted expected life-time wealth of a consumer. We start by
introducing income uncertainty into the overlapping generation framework. Thereafter, we de￿ne
explicitly the income generating process, its front loaded information content and derive the expected
risk-adjusted wealth. Finally we modify the implied life-time budget constraint accounting for habit
formation.
3.1.1 Risk adjusted life-time wealth
As in Blanchard (1985), each agent faces a constant probability of death ￿. Agents are sel￿sh in a
sense that they have no bequest motive. To remove involuntary bequests resulting from uncertainty
about death, access to fair annuity markets are assumed, i.e. agents can contract with life insurance
companies to receive a payment contingent on their death. Denoting by Vk;t the end of period t
real non-human wealth of an agent born in the beginning of period k, agents in the k-th cohort may
contract to receive a payment (￿=(1 ￿ ￿))Vk;t￿1, if they do not die and pay Vk;t￿1, if they do die
in the beginning of period t. Hence, no bequests to younger generations are left. Now the dynamic
budget constraint of identical individuals in the k-th cohort is:




+ yk;t ￿ ck;t
￿
(1)
In (1) yk;t is labour income (net of taxes minus transfers), ck;t is consumption and rt is the real
interest rate in period t. For each consumer the dynamic budget constraint (1) implies the following
(ex-post) intertemporal budget constraint:
1 X
i=0







Rt;t+i (1 ￿ ￿)
i yk;t+i (2)
where Rt;t+i = (1 + rt)=
Qi
j=0 (1 + rt+j).
We treat the real interest rate deterministic and, for notational reasons, constant in our theoretical
analysis. Accordingly Rt;t+i = Ri when i ￿ 1. However, to allow the separation of the (constant)
where the choice of optimal portfolio is separated from the rest of the household￿ s optimization problem (Markowitz,
1952).11
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equilibrium long-term interest rate from the short-term rate in our analysis, we denote
￿






Now, with an uncertain income stream (2) can be written in the form:
P1














Ri (1 ￿ ￿)
i vk;t+i = Wk;t
(3)
where vk;t+i = yk;t+i ￿ Etyk;t+i, Et is the expectation operator, HE
k;t (= EtHk;t) is expected human
wealth and Wk;t total (ex post) wealth. We see that (3) contains also the present value of stochastic
income innovations vk;t+i , the size of which is not known ex ante. However, a deterministic risk-
adjusted life time-wealth equivalent to the ex-ante uncertain wealth can be derived, if the stochastic
properties of the income generation process are known. In addition, this risk-adjusted wealth is
separable to expected wealth component (Vk;t￿1=(1 ￿ ￿)+HE
k;t) and the risk-adjustment component,
i.e. the present value of the planned precautionary saving, if the functional form of the utility function
is CRRA. However, before showing this we discuss the information set available to the consumer
concerning her future income realisations. In that regard we deviate from the convention that the
consumer has either perfect foresight or that, besides the knowledge of the stochastic properties of the
past income stream, the consumer has no additional information on her future income realisations.
We assume that the consumer may have a lot of period-speci￿c information concerning future income
changes although this information may be strongly front-loaded.
3.1.2 Front loaded information and the expected human wealth
Denote by xk;t+i the set of the ex-ante possible outcomes of the future realizations of income changes
￿yk;t+i. Assume that there are two kinds of information concerning future income realizations, i.e.
information on the stochastic properties of the past income stream, which for simplicity is assumed
to follow a random walk, and period-speci￿c information on future income realizations. The amount
of period-speci￿c information concerning the period t+i is measured by the parameter ￿t+i, which
can range from zero to one. The closer to zero (one) ￿t+i, the less (more) the amount of period-





the conditional probability density function containing both time series and period
speci￿c information available to the consumer on period t about future realization ￿yk;t+i. It is






is asymmetric being the more skewed towards the







can quite ￿ exibly be presented as a mixture of two normally distributed






















, related to the period speci￿c information, is normally distrib-










the random walk realizations, is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ￿2
h. The weights12
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￿t+i and 1 ￿ ￿t+i show the shares of probability mass related to period-speci￿c information and to
the random-walk process respectively. Under that assumption it is straightforward to show that the































, i.e. the expected income realisation,
approaches to ￿yk;t+i and the variance to zero, i.e. to the limiting case of perfect foresight. Corre-






coincides with h(￿) with zero mean and variance ￿2
h.
To be empirically applicable, one additional assumption concerning the distribution of the period-
speci￿c information over the planning horizon is required. For that purpose, it is natural to assume that
the information content is wider concerning income changes in the near future than regarding longer
planning horizons. To be more explicit we assume that the information parameter ￿t+i is determined
by the following simple process ￿t+i = ￿i. Now on the basis of (6) Etyk;t+i = yk;t +
Pi
j=1 ￿j￿yk;t+j















1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R￿





The important property of relation (7) is that the average size of expected human wealth HE
k;t is
practically una⁄ected by the size of the information parameter ￿. This results from the fact that with
￿ R = R the term:
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R￿




i = 1=[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)R]
which is independent from ￿. Therefore, while a decrease in ￿ reduces the size of the discounted
income term
Pi
j=1 [R(1 ￿ ￿)￿]
j yk;t+j and makes the dependency of HE
k;t from future income stream
more front loaded, it also increases the size of the scaling factor
1￿(1￿￿) ￿ R￿
1￿(1￿￿) ￿ R , which compensates the
e⁄ect of ￿ on the discounted income term.
3.1.3 Expected risk-adjusted wealth
We assume that, in making risk adjustment to her uncertain expected life-time wealth the consumer
applies the conventional Arrow-Pratt approach to risk, i.e. the consumer de￿nes the deterministic
equivalent for which she would be willing to exchange her expected, but risky, life-time wealth. How-
ever, in deriving the relevant risk adjustment to the wealth it matters how long the consumer expects
her current consumption plan to remain relevant without a major revision. If the consumer in her
mental accounting framework thinks that after having maximized her intertemporal utility in the
beginning of current period she needs never again maximize her utility, then the uncertainty measure
relevant for risk adjustment would be the variance of the discounted stochastic income-innovation
stream
P1
i=1 [R(1 ￿ ￿)]
i vk;t+i. However, if the consumer expects that she needs to repeat her util-
ity maximization already in the beginning of the next period then the relevant uncertainty measure13
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would be the variance of vk;t+1. Conceptually the expected length of the interval between two succes-
sive maximization dates (revision interval) resembles the length of delay period during which in the
delayed-adjustment / inattentive consumer models consumers do not update their consumption (see
e.g. Gabaix and Laibson, 2001; Reis, 2006). For expositional convenience, but without loss of quali-
tative generality, we assume in the following that the underlying data frequency and the consumption
revision interval coincide. Now the statistical properties of the expected wealth based on di⁄erences
in information content between two successive periods determine the relevant uncertainty measure of
wealth3.
For that purpose, we de￿ne the period t expected human wealth conditional for both the informa-
tion available in the beginning of period t and in the beginning of period t+1:
EtHk;t = HE
k;t = yt + R(1 ￿ ￿)EtHk;t+1 (9)
Et+1Hk;t = yt + R(1 ￿ ￿)Et+1Hk;t+1 (10)
The di⁄erence of (10) and (9) determines the impact of the increment of period t+1 information on
period t expected human wealth, if it were available already in the beginning of period t, i.e.4
Et+1Hk;t ￿ HE





If the consumer has also period speci￿c information, as we discussed in the previous section, then
equation (7) implies that the square bracket term on the right hand side of (11) is equal to:























Now, with the expected human wealth HE






￿ R(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)











i=0 ￿k;i = 1. We see that the more period speci￿c
information is available (the closer to unity ￿), the smaller the addition of information and its impact
on the expected human wealth. With ￿=1, (13) coincides with perfect foresight.
Equations (13) de￿ne the expected human wealth including the related uncertainty in terms of one
period addition in information content. The next step is to derive the deterministic wealth equivalent,
3It is quite straightforward to extend the analysis to account for the possibility that the time frequency in data
is higher (e.g. one quarter) than the length of period (n quarters) that is relevant for determining the size of risk
adjustment to human wealth, Willman (2007).
4We could also say that whilst HE
t is period t expectation, Et+iHt is its period t+i realization and Ht is its realization
when i ! 1 .14
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~ Wk;t = Vk;t￿1=(1 ￿ ￿) + ~ Hk;t, for which the consumer would be willing to exchange her wealth
containing uncertain human wealth as de￿ned by (13), i.e.
Et+1Wk;t = Vk;t￿1=(1 ￿ ￿) + HE











1￿ ￿ R(1￿￿)￿ ￿k;i with 0 ￿
P1
i=0 ￿k;i ￿ R(1 ￿ ￿).

















































= log ~ Wk;t (15)
Now equation (13) implies the following solution for the risk-adjusted human wealth5:






















Relation (16) shows that the risk adjusted human wealth can be presented as the multiplicand ￿k;tof
the expected human wealth , which is a nonlinear function of the variance of stochastic labour income
and the human wealth to total wealth ratio. Hence, we can present the risk-adjusted life-time budget









k;t = ~ Wk;t (17)
3.1.4 The life-time budget constraint with habit formation
We next modify the life-time budget constraint to account for habit formation. The habit formation
implies non-separability in utility over time. In internal-habit models, habit depends on a household￿ s
own past consumption and the household takes account of this when choosing how much to consume as
e.g. in Muellbauer (1988), Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995), Sundaresan (1989) and Constantinides
(1990). The simplest treatment of habit is to replace the argument ck;t+i in the utility function by
c￿
k;t+i = ck;t+i ￿ ack;t+i￿1, where the parameter a measures habit persistence with a>0 and the
term ack;t+i￿1 is the time-varying habit level of consumption. Following Muellbauer (1988), after
substituting c￿
k;t+i + ack;t+i￿1 for ck;t+i, the life-time resource constraint (17) can be modi￿ed to the
form:



















1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ R
￿ ~ Wk;t ￿ a ￿ ck;t￿1 (18)
3.2 The optimal consumption rule and the aggregate consumption func-
tion
In this section we derive the optimal consumption rule for consumers in cohort k. Then we aggregate
across cohorts and show that aggregate consumption can be expressed in terms of aggregate non-
human and risk-adjusted human wealth.
Corresponding our earlier risk-analysis we assume that the consumer￿ s preferences can be described
by the logarithmic utility function. Hence, subject to the budget constraint (18), each consumer
belonging to the cohort k maximizes her expected inter-temporal utility:































k;tR￿i (1 + ￿)
￿i (20)
After substituting this condition to the risk-adjusted life-time budget constraint (18) we obtain:
ck;t = ￿
￿








+ a(1 ￿ ￿) ck;t￿1 (21)
where ￿ =
￿+￿
1+￿ ￿ ￿+￿, and we see that via ￿k;t the consumption function (21) implies precautionary
saving out of expected human wealth HE
k;t.
Assume next that the size of each cohort when born is ￿. Accordingly, in period t the size of cohort
born in period k is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
t￿k and the size of population is
Pt
k=￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
t￿k = 1. This results in
the following aggregation rule: zt =
Pt
k=￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
t￿k zk;t and zt￿1 =
Pt￿1






. Following Blanchard (1985) we also assume that, except for across generation
di⁄erences in stochastic income innovations, labour income is equally distributed across population.
Now the aggregation of (21) gives:6
ct = ￿
￿








+ a(1 ￿ ￿)ct￿1 (22)
An interesting implication of aggregation is that, although over the life-cycle of an individual con-







, this does not necessarily imply that on the aggregate level ￿t should be
non-stationary. In fact, under conventional assumptions of overlapping generation modelling, saving
6To end up with (22) the Taylor approximation is used:
Pt
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and wealth accumulation across cohorts follow the same life-time pro￿le (except for discrepancies re-







constant. Therefore, in the following our maintained hypothesis is that ￿t is stationary7.
To express (22) in terms of observable variables, we forward (22) by one period and take expecta-
tions. Thereafter we multiply it by Rt (1 ￿ ￿)￿, subtract it from (22) and utilize the aggregate-level
dynamic budget constraint Vt = R
￿1
t [Vt￿1 + yt ￿ ct] implied by (1) (compare to Blanchard, 1985;




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)aRt ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ R
￿￿￿
ct = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ RtEtct+1 + a(1 ￿ ￿) ct￿1
+
￿






















Equations (23) covers a wide range of alternative cases. If ￿ = 0, the overlapping generations
framework reduces to that of in￿nitely living representative agent framework. If no habit formation
exists (a = 0), then consumption is determined by the beginning of period ￿nancial wealth and the
future income stream. Consumption is the more forward-looking, the closer to unity the information
parameter ￿. In the opposite polar case with ￿ = 0 consumers have no period-speci￿c information
and consumption is determined by the beginning of period ￿nancial wealth, current labour income
and, with habit formation, the lagged consumption.
4 Firm behaviour
The ￿rm maximizes its expected discounted stream of dividends, Vt. Without loss of generality, for
notational simplicity, we assume that bank loans are the only form of external ￿nancing. We ￿rst
de￿ne the determination of dividends in terms of income and cost components. Regarding cost, as in
McAdam and Willman (2008), we allow a careful modelling of factor adjustment costs. Labour par-
ticipation decisions are modeled along the intensive and extensive margins. In so doing, we introduce
the concept of ￿e⁄ective labour hours￿ . An innovative aspect is that the former margin turns out
to have a key spillover onto ￿rms￿pricing decisions. Capital accumulation, in turn, re￿ ects time-to-
build considerations. To capture price and in￿ ation stickiness we adopt three valued Calvo-signalling
mechanism, which as discussed in McAdam and Willman (2010), implies that each ￿rm faces ex ante
exactly the same optimization problem independently from the ex post outcome of the Calvo-signal.
In addition to conventional demand and technology constraints the present value maximisation is con-
strained by non-negativity of gross investment and by the upper bound for the debt-to-capital stock
ratio. Hence, the estimated aggregate level equations assume that for a certain percent of ￿rms these
constrains are binding. In addition, our aggregation accounts for the e⁄ects of structural changes in
sectoral output shares from competitive (low mark-up) manufacturing to less-competitive (high-mark-
up) services sectors. This phenomenon introduces secularly growing mark-up on aggregate price level
as discussed by Willman (2002) and McAdam and Willman (2004).
7In general, however, it is possible that variation in the aggregate non-human to human wealth ratio a⁄ects the
marginal propensity to consume out of expected human wealth. If true, this would introduce an additional nonlinearity
into the wealth channel. However, besides being di¢ cult to identify, the impact of this nonlinearity on aggregate
consumption can be thought to be of second-order magnitude. This is very di⁄erent from the role of the non-human
to human wealth ratio in explaining cross-sectional di⁄erences in consumption, where this ratio can be thought to play
the role of ￿rst order importance.17
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We ￿rst present this framework using general functional notations and later, before deriving esti-
mated speci￿cations, present precise functional de￿nitions of cost and production functions.
4.1 Output, costs and dividends
The output of a ￿rm is de￿ned by the production function,
Y = F (Kt;Ht;t) (24)
Yt = output, Kt = capital stock, Ht= Ntht = labour input is measured in terms of ￿ e⁄ective￿labour
hours, Nt = the number of employees, and ht = ￿ e⁄ective￿working hours per employee.
From the point of view of production the relevant labour input concept is e⁄ective (or intensive)
hours worked. Hence, a ￿rm can increase labour input either by recruiting new employees or increasing
the number of e⁄ective hours (via work intensity or overtime) per worker of existing employees. If
wage agreements are basically ￿xed time contracts with overtime premium and, in addition, recruiting
new employees and ￿ring existing ones are associated with costs, then wage costs per e¢ cient hour
are above the contracted straight (normal) time rate both when e⁄ective hours ht are either below (as
hours with low intensity are paid at the same rate as hours with normal intensity) or above normal
hours ￿ h. Hence, total wage costs can be presented as a convex function of the deviation of e⁄ective





ht ￿ ￿ h
￿￿




> 0if ht > ￿ h
￿ 0if ht ￿ ￿ h
and
@2Ah
@h2 ￿ 0 (25)
Ah (￿) accounts for the cost e⁄ects of overtime wage premium and variations in work intensity. By
assuming, as in Shapiro (1986) and Bils (1987), that all workers in the ￿rm - and even more so across
￿rms and industries - do not work the same number of hours nor at the same intensity, the function
Ah (￿) can be treated as continuously di⁄erentiable, although for an individual employee the wage rate
may jump up discontinuously when his hired hours exceed normal hours h ￿ ￿ h > 0.
Accounting also for adjustment costs associated with changes in both employment as well as with
capital, real dividends (Divt) are determined as:










￿(Kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt￿1) ￿ AK (Kt;Kt￿1;Kt￿2) + B
j




Pt = output price; ￿ Wt= straight-time wage rate; Bt= net real external debt ￿nancing and rt = the
real interest rate.
Functions AN (￿) and AK (￿) represent adjustment cost functions for labour and capital, whose
exact form, as the function of Ah (￿), will be de￿ned later. Note, that for capital, we assume that
adjustment costs can additionally accommodate changes in the rate of capital stock accumulation; this
extra cost essentially re￿ ects time-to-build considerations in investment formation, and is empirically
supported.
4.2 Three-valued state dependent Arrow-Calvo signal
At the beginning of each period, assume ￿rms receive a time-varying signal regarding price setting in
the following three-valued manner:
1./ With a probability ￿t ￿rm j receives the signal indicating that the ￿rm is not allowed to




t￿1. As McAdam and Willman (2010) we allow the signal to be state
dependent. i.e. its value depends on in￿ ation and market structure. Speci￿cally, we assume that in a18
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high-in￿ ation environment price changes are more frequent than otherwise. The following functional
form captures these ideas:





￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿t)
(1￿") (27)
where ￿ 2 [0; 1] and ￿t 2 [0; ￿] 8￿t ￿ 0; as we shall demonstrate, functional form (27) is particularly
convenient to preclude linearization of the optimal reset price.
2./ With a probability (1 ￿ ￿t) ! ￿rm j is allowed to change its price following a backward-looking





t￿1 is the average
price level selected by ￿rms able to change price at time t-1, and where ! 2 [0; 1] represents the
fraction of ￿rms able to reset prices but who do so in this rule-of-thumb manner.
3./ With a probability (1 ￿ ￿t)(1 ￿ !) ￿rm j receives the signal that allows it to reset its price on





Assume each ￿rm solves its pro￿t-maximization problem in the beginning of the period with full
information on all current-period variables - except for the price-setting category to which it belongs
ex-post. Regarding the reset signal itself, the prior probability distribution is known, i.e. Et￿t = ￿t

















t , the equality EtPt = Pt continues to hold at
the aggregate level. That is, because period t aggregated price components (will be de￿ned later)
as well the weighting structure are known ex ante although individual ￿rms do not know to which
pricing category they belong ex post. Accordingly, in the context of optimizing the advantage of
the three-valued signal is that in the beginning of each period, before the outcome of the signal is
known, each ￿rm faces exactly the same optimization problem, (i.e. in an ex-ante sense, all ￿rms are
pro￿t-maximizers).
4.3 The ￿rst order conditions of the pro￿t maximising ￿rm - dynamic
Euler conditions

















where variables with superscripts refer to the ￿rm j and variables without superscript refer to the
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where ￿t;t+i refers to the discount rate and ￿k
t+i (with k=Y, B, I) refer to the Lagrangean multipliers
associated with the demand constraint of output, the upper bound of the real debt-to-capital-stock
ratio and the non-negativity of gross investment. After applying expectation rule (28) and observing
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> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(32)










t+i. The ￿rst order condition of max-
imization with espect to h
j
t+i implies that Lagrangean multiplier ￿Y
t+i can be expressed in terms of















































t together with (33) result in the following
































































We have dropped the superscript j in MCR, because all ￿rms have same expectations and, hence,
the same expected marginal costs9.









t do not a⁄ect the solution of (31) and, therefore, they can be neglected
in (32). We have also dropped expectation operator although all forward values of variables refer to their expectations
rather than to their later actual realizations.
9Our implicit assumption is that ￿B
t+i = ￿B
t 8i ￿ 0 .20
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Relation (36) can be further simpli￿ed by assuming as e.g. Woodford (2003) that households














where C denotes consumption, and ￿ is the discount factor. For the logarithmic utility function























where ￿ = (" ￿ 1)
￿1 and MCN are the mark-up and nominal marginal cost of labour, respectively.
The logarithmic approximation of (38) can be written as,
p
f




i Et (mcnt+i + ￿) (39)


























After de￿ning explicitly adjustment cost functions AN (￿) and AK (￿) as well as the cost function
associated with the deviations of e¢ cient hours from normal hours Ah (￿), equations (35) and (40)
determine dynamic demand for employees and capital and (39) determines the optimal price of ￿rms,
which are allowed to reset their prices optimally. An important driving variable, e¢ cient hours H t, is
determined by the inverted production function (24). However, to be able to operationalise it as well as
the marginal product of capital and labour needed by dynamic factor demand and price equations, we
have to know the exact functional form and parameter values of the production function. Therefore
we ￿rst specify the frictionless steady state implied by the dynamic ￿rst order conditions and the
production function. As the Monte Carlo study by Le￿n-Ledesma, McAdam and Willman (2010)
shows, this o⁄ers an e¢ cient way to estimate the central parameters of the medium-run supply side.21
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4.4 Functional forms of the factor adjustment costs and the e¢ cient to
normal hours wage premium
4.4.1 Convex adjustment cost functions of labour and capital
For estimation we must de￿ne explicit functional forms for adjustment cost functions AN, AK. Where
relations between variables are multiplicative, as here, quasi-quadratic adjustment costs result in
particularly elegant results, Willman et al (2000). The adjustment cost functions, and for comparison,




























where n = log(N) and k = log(K) and parameters aN > 0;aK > 0;bk￿[0;1]:
The advantage of the chosen functional form over its quadratic counterpart is that its di⁄erentials




























￿ = ￿aN￿nt+1 (45)
4.4.2 E¢ cient to normal hours wage premium
In the spirit of indivisible labour (e.g., Kinoshita, 1987, Trejo, 1991, Rogerson, 1988) assume that
contracts are drawn up in terms of ￿xed (or normal) working hours per employee, i.e. in terms of
the straight-time wage rate. In general, e⁄ective hours in excess of normal hours attract a premium.
Conversely, employers have limited possibilities to decrease paid hours when e⁄ective hours fall below
normal ones. Hence, total wage costs can be presented as a convex function of the deviation of
e⁄ective hours from normal hours. With normal hours normalised to unity, i.e ￿ h = 1, and using a
variant of the ￿￿xed-wage￿model of Trejo (1991) for overtime pay, the following function gives a local
approximation of this relation in the neighbourhood of e⁄ective hours equalling normal hours10:








;ah ￿ 0 (46)
where Wt is wage compensation per employee and ￿ Wt is the straight-time wage rate which each ￿rm
takes as given. Conditional on the contracted straight-time wage rate and the overtime wage premium
function, e⁄ective hours are completely demand determined. Firms can also freely (but not costlessly)
determine the allocation of total e⁄ective hours into e⁄ective hours per employee and the number of
employees.
10Trejo￿ s (1991) focus was in overtime hours and, therefore, he did not distinguish between e⁄ective and paid hours.
Hence, our formulation is compatible with his when ht ￿ ￿ h and e⁄ective and paid hours are equal. However, our
formulation also accounts for the possibility that e⁄ective hours are below normal (i.e. paid) hours.22
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4.5 Dynamic factor demand equations
Substituting these cost functions (42)-(43) (and their derivatives) into (35) and (40) and utilizing the
relation Wt = ￿ Wt
h
ht + ah
2 (ht ￿ 1)
2
i

































































































In (48) @F=@K refers to the marginal product of capital. In addition, in ending up relation (48) we
allowed (unlike the simpli￿ed maximisation problem (32) assumes) the price of investment PI
t , due to
import content, to deviate from the output price and, therefore, we expressed real marginal cost MCRt
in terms of investment rather than output price and then utilized the relation: Pt
P I
t = (1 + ￿) MCNt
P I
t .
4.6 New Keynesian Phillips-curve for prices
Three-valued Arrow-Calvo signal implies that the aggregate price, pt, (lower case denoting logs) can
be de￿ned as the weighted sum of the reset and lagged price (see the detailed derivation in McAdam
and Willman (2010))
pt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)pv
t + ￿tpt￿1 (49)
where
pv




Inserting (50) into (49), subtracting pt￿1 from both sides and rearranging, yields,








Furthermore, using (49) to solve for pv
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and after substituting forward we derive
f￿p + !p [1 ￿ ￿p (1 ￿ ￿)]g￿pt ￿ !p￿pt￿1 ￿ ￿￿pEt￿pt+1=










This corresponds to a conventional hybrid NKPC as in Gali and Gertler (1999) except the last term
containing quadratic in￿ ation and the operational de￿nition of the marginal cost variable. Regarding
the quadratic in￿ ation term that makes the (54) state dependent we, however, for simplicity neglect
it in our estimation although, if desired, it can easily be introduced into relation, see McAdam and
Willman (2010).
The ￿rst-order maximisation condition (33) de￿ning the real marginal costs, the wage relation
(46) de￿ning compensation per employee, and the production function (24) solved for e¢ cient hours






























5 Union behaviour: Wage setting
Consider an imperfectly competitive labour market, where a large number of monopoly unions de-
termine real wages of their members under a right to manage structure (i.e. ￿rms determine the
employment level given the wage determined by unions). In renewing wage contracts each union sets24
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the wage rate knowing its e⁄ects on employment determined by ￿rms. Labour is indivisible so that
variations in demand for labour determined by ￿rms are transmitted to the number of unemployed in-
stead of the hours worked per employee. In addition, assume that contracts are binding until they are
renegotiated. That introduces stickiness in wage formation. In the following we ￿rst introduce Calvo
staggering wage determination and thereafter we derive the determination of the optimal frictionless
wage rate based on two alternative behavioural assumptions.
5.1 Calvo staggering wage in￿ ation
To account for wage stickiness Calvo signaling mechanism in wage setting is assumed. Accordingly
(i) with a probability ￿w union j receives the signal indicating that the union is not allowed to change




t￿1; (ii) with a probability (1 ￿ ￿w) !w union j is allowed to change its price






t￿1 is the average price level selected by ￿rms able to change price at
time t-1, and where !w 2 [0; 1] represents the fraction of unions able to reset wages but who do so in
this rule-of-thumb manner, which mimics the often observed catching up behaviour of many unions in
response to earlier wage rises of other unions. Finally (iii) with a probability (1 ￿ ￿w)(1 ￿ !w) union

























t , is still un-
de￿ned. For de￿ning w
f
t we follow Rotenberg (1987) and describe unions optimization process as a
two-step procedure. In the ￿rst step, optimising unions determines the optimal wage rate w￿
t and
its expected path in the absence of all frictional elements in wage setting. Then in the second step
forward-looking unions set the wage rate w
f
t so that it minimizes a quadratic loss function that de-
pends on the di⁄erence between the reset price over the periods it is expected to remain ￿xed and
the optimal wage level maximizing the utility of representative member in the absence of restriction













which implies the following optimal reset wage rate:
w
f




























After substituting forward (58) can written in the conventional NKPC form:
f￿w + !w [1 ￿ ￿w (1 ￿ ￿)]g￿wt = !w￿wt￿1+￿￿
wEt￿wt+1+ (1 ￿ !w)(1 ￿ ￿w)(1 ￿ ￿￿w)(w￿
t ￿ wt)
(59)
We next present the determination of the frictionless optimal wage rate w￿
t based on two alternative
behavioural assumptions.25
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5.2 The frictionless wage rate
We assume that part of the unions are utilitarian, maximising the utility of member households, whilst
the rest are non-utilitarian keeping wage development in line with productivity development coupled
with a high desired employment rate.
5.2.1 The wage setting of utilitarian unions
Assume as Hansen (1985) that through union membership employees have access to an insurance
market which allows them to insure their income with respect of being unemployed. If employed, the
employee receives compensation equalling W ￿￿ h , where W contract wage and ￿ h is ￿xed hours worked.
If unemployed, the employee gets unemployment compensation B. However, for the unemployment
insurance union members have to pay membership fee covering paid insurance bene￿ts. By assuming
the logarithmic utility function the maximization problem of an utilitarian monopoly union under a



















U (1 ￿ nt)
￿
at + Bt=PC








t are consumption of employed and unemployed union member, nt is the the prob-
ability to be employed (i.e. the employment rate Nt=NF
t with Nt referring to the total number of
employees and NF
t to the labour force). ￿
Eand ￿
Uare Lagrangian multipliers related to the budget
constraint of employed and unemployed union members, respectively, and ￿
F the Lagrangian mul-
tiplier related to the labour demand of the pro￿t maximizing ￿rm. at is the initial real wealth of
(identical) consumers, FN is the marginal product of labour, Pt is the de￿ ator of production and PC
t
is the de￿ ator of consumption.
It is straightforward to show that the maximization of (60) with respect to CE
t , CU





t and Bt=W ￿￿ h and the union maximization problem (60) can be reduced into
the form
MaxL = logCt ￿ nt￿ + ￿
C ￿









￿ (1 + ￿)Wt=Pt
￿
(61)
The maximisation of (61) with respect to consumption Ct, the employment rate nt and real wage
rate Wt=PC





































; ￿ > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour and ￿N is labour augmenting technical progress.
Recalling that C t is the consumption of an individual union member, which can be expressed in terms
of aggregate data as Ct = ~ Ct=NF
t (where ~ Ct is aggregate private consumption). Now (62) implies the


















Lower case letters refer to the logs of the corresponding upper case variables.26
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5.2.2 The wage setting of non-utilitarian unions
Unions know that the frictionless real wage rate is de￿ned by the pro￿t maximising condition of
the ￿rm Wt=Pt = FN (Nt;Kt)=(1 + ￿). In equilibrium this condition holds for all possible levels of
employment and unions know that by ￿xing the nominal wage rate they also ￿x the (equilibrium)
employment rate. By assuming that the aim of non-utilitarian unions is to keep the employment rate









;0 < $ ￿ 1;￿ > 0 (64)
If all unions are non-utilitarian, then in the full model context the relation (64) implies a constant
long-run natural rate of unemployment. If instead, all or part of unions are utilitarian, then shocks
that a⁄ect the demand structure, e.g. a permanent government expenditure shock a⁄ecting the GDP
share of private consumption, a⁄ect also the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate.
5.2.3 The frictionless optimal wage rate
For estimating the NKPC wage equation (59), we de￿ne the frictionless wage rate w￿
t as a weighted
average of the rates implied by (63) and (64). Hence, we write:
w￿
t = awu ￿ wu￿
































6 The Foreign trade block
6.1 Exports and export prices
The ￿rst-order conditions of an optimising ￿rm that produces export goods, through the combination
of labour, capital and imported goods, allow us to write export prices as a mark-up over marginal
costs. We assume that the demand for exports takes an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) form,
depending on world demand for exports, Denton and Muellbauer (1980). The advantage of this
representation is that the elasticity of the demand is no longer constant but depends on the relative
competitor export prices. Pro￿t maximisation under the almost ideal demand system type of export
demand function results in the following 2-equation system for the export volume and export price,




) = a + b ￿ f(time) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(pX ￿ pCX) (66)27
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pX = a +
1 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
2 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
((1 ￿ ax)(w ￿ mpn) + axpM)
+
1
2 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
pCX (67)
PX = Export de￿ ator; X = Export volume; PCX= the external competitor export prices; MF =
the world demand for exports; w = compensation per worker; mpn = marginal product of labour;
pM = import de￿ ator; a = point market share (with indexed data close to unity); ￿ > 1 is the
representative point price elasticity of exports; b if di⁄erent from zero measures the deviation of
income elasticity of export demand from unity; and aX = import content of exports (input-output
estimate). Lower case letters refer to the logs of variables. In estimating the system (66)-(67) an
additional trend variable was allowed in the price equation.
6.2 Imports and import prices
The modelling approach of imports is conventional. The import supply curve is assumed to be
horizontal and, hence, import volume is demand determined. Accordingly two driving variables are
the domestic demand indicator WER and the relative price of domestic production and imports.
Domestic indicator is determined as a weighted sum of domestic and export demand components.
Single year estimates of the import content of each demand component are used as weights. However,
accounting for the fact that the growth of world trade has been faster than the growth of world GDP
that on a single county level can be seen as growing GDP shares of both imports and exports we
add to the import equation the ratio of exports to the constructed demand indicator. As world trade
increasingly is the trade of intermediaries this should especially be seen as the rising import share
of exports. Hence, we specify the long-run equilibrium aggregate demand for imports M to depend
on the demand indicator (with unit elasticity), the ratio of exports to the demand indicator and the
relative domestic-to-import price:
m = ￿1 + ￿2 (p ￿ pMN) + wer + ￿3 (x ￿ wer) (68)
The import price pMN excludes the imports of energy and lower-case letters refer to the logs of
variables.
For forecasting purposes the import de￿ ator is divided into energy and non-energy component.
The price elasticity of imported energy is assumed to zero that is a reasonable approximation in
the forecasting horizon although less realistic from the long-run perspective. The equation for the
import de￿ ator excluding energy is quite traditional. It depends on the GDP de￿ ator (to capture
possible pricing to market e⁄ects) net of indirect taxes, and the competitors￿import price with static
homogeneity condition imposed
pMN = ￿1(p + log(1 ￿ TX1)) + (1 ￿ ￿1)pCM (69)
The GDP de￿ ator at factor cost is included in the speci￿cation in order to capture the pricing-
to-market behaviour of the foreign ￿rms. Therefore, this speci￿cation implies that energy prices have
some second round e⁄ects on non-energy import prices. Equation (69) de￿nes the equilibrium relation,
while the dynamic speci￿cations are conventional error-correction equations. The aggregate import
de￿ ator is determined as a weighted average of imported energy price PE and the non-energy import
price PMN (in logs) :
pM = ￿EpE + (1 ￿ ￿E)pMN (70)28
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7 Production function and the medium-run supply system
In this section we start by specifying the explicit form of the production function. Thereafter we
present the 5-equation medium-run supply-system implied by the ￿rst order conditions of pro￿t max-
imization of the ￿rm and the utility maximisation of labour unions. The parameter estimates of this
system de￿nes empirically the production function, the marginal products of inputs and the mark-up
needed in estimating dynamic labour demand, capital formation, inventory, export, price and wage
equations.
7.1 The Normalised CES production function
Our technology assumption is the ￿normalized￿CES function allowing for time-varying factor aug-
menting technical progress. The importance of explicitly normalizing CES functions was discovered
by La Grandville (1989) and ￿rst implemented empirically by Klump, McAdam and Willman (2007).
Normalization starts from the observation that a family of CES functions whose members are distin-
guished only by di⁄erent substitution elasticities need a common benchmark point. Since the elasticity
of substitution is de￿ned as a point elasticity, one needs to ￿x benchmark values for the level of pro-
duction, factor inputs and marginal rate of substitution, or equivalently for per-capita production,
capital deepening and factor income shares. The normalized CES production function corresponding






















where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, ￿0 distribution parameter equalling
the capital share evaluated at the normalization point (subscript 0) and ￿i (t;t0) de￿ne the (indexed)
level of technical progress associated to factor i (with ￿i (t0;t0) = 1).
7.1.1 Technical progress
As it is not obvious that growth rates should always be constant, we follow an agnostic approach and











where i = N; K. The log level of technical progress, ￿i ( ￿) is, therefore, a function of time, t
(around its normalization point t0), a curvature parameter, ￿i, and has a growth rate of ￿i at the




limt!1 [log￿i(t)] = 1 if￿i > 0
limt!1 [log￿i(t)] = ￿
￿it0
￿i > 0 if￿i < 0
(73)
11Le￿n-Ledesma, McAdam and Willman (2009) discuss and evaluate normalization more extensively.
12Note we scaled the Box-Cox speci￿cation by t0 to interpret ￿N and ￿K as the rates of labour- and capital-
augmenting technical change at the ￿xed (i.e., representative) point.29
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￿i￿1 > 0; lim t!1
@ log ￿i(t)
@t = 1 if￿i > 1
= ￿i; 8t if￿i = 1
> 0; limt!1
@ log ￿i(t)
@t = 0 if￿i < 1
(75)
Thus, if ￿i ￿ 0, the level of technical progress accruing from factor i tends to in￿nity but is bounded
otherwise (73). If ￿i = 1 the factor growth of technical progress is constant (i.e., the ￿text-book￿
case) but asymptotes to zero from above for any ￿i < 1, (74).
7.2 The supply system
The steady-state form of the three optimising private sector decision making units, i.e. ￿rms, trade
unions and households can be reduced to a four-equation supply-side system, which allows an e¢ cient
way to estimate the parameters of the production function, Le￿n-Ledesma et al. (2009). It is straight
forward to see that in a frictionless world with AN (￿) and AK (￿) vanishing e¢ cient hours ht equals ￿ h,
which is convenient to normalize to unity. Also the straight-time wage rate ￿ Wt equals wage compen-
sation per employee Wt and, hence, real marginal cost de￿ned by (33) is MCRt = Wt
Pt = @F
@Nt. Dynamic
Euler equation (35) disappears as its both sides equal zero and conditions (38)-(40) reduce to the
￿rst order conditions of maximisation with respect to labour and capital of the conventional static
optimisation framework. In addition, Willman (2002) and McAdam and Willman (2004) showed that,
if income and price elasticities of demand deviate across production sectors, then the aggregation of
the ￿rst order conditions of maximization and the production function introduces a trend into the ag-
gregate data mark-up although all ￿rm level (or sectoral) mark-ups would remain constant. Further,
by incorporating into the system optimal (frictionless) wage setting equation (64) the steady-state
system can be transformed into a full-￿ edged ￿ve-equation supply system Accounting for this e⁄ect,
the static aggregated system of ￿rst order conditions and the production function supplemented with




























































+ log(1 + ￿(t)) = 0 (78)30
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where Y, N and K refer to output, employment and capital. Py, w and q are their respective
prices; C, Pc and N F are consumption, consumption de￿ ator and labour force. Bars above the
variables refer to the sample averages.13 Normalised production function implies that
*
￿ =
￿ q ￿ K
￿ w ￿ N+￿ q ￿ K is
the capital share evaluated at the ￿xed point (sample mean).
Aggregation across heterogeneous sectors facing di⁄erentiated price and income elasticities of de-
mand introduces a trend component into the mark-up as shown in (76). The task of this equation
is to control this common trend component in equations (77) and (78) which are the steady state
forms of the ￿rst order conditions of pro￿t maximisation with respect of labour and capital. Equation
(79) is the production function (71) after taking logs on its both sides. Equation (80) determining
the optimal frictionless wage rate is the ￿rst order condition of maximisation of the utilitarian trade
union under the right-to-manage structure, as is shown in section 4. It is part of the supply side
system as it is conditional to the same production technology as the ￿rm￿ s maximisation conditions.
In estimating of (80) variable ￿ ht, referring to average normal working hours per employee, was also
allowed to include a box-cox trend to account for observed decrease in total hours per employee ratio.
8 Estimation of the model
The country models have been designed from the beginning to have a common underlying structure,
but a structure that is general enough to allow for cross-country di⁄erences. In particular the CES
structure with non-unit elasticity of substitution and varying technical progress gives ￿ exibility in
the production process. Furthermore the other equations re￿ ect cross-country di⁄erences due to
di⁄erences in the estimated parameters, e.g. the estimated New Keynesian Phillips curves contain
both forward and backward looking behaviour, the relative weights of which vary across countries.
Indeed, the modelling approach has been, within the constraints of the common theoretic setting, to
allow the data to determine estimated parameter values, with only a limited amount of constraints.
8.1 Data for estimation
The statistical data used to estimate the model is based on quarterly data from 1980 to 2007 Q2. The
data follow the new European System of National Accounts (ESA95) methodology, therefore the main
source for the country data is Eurostat and in particular the European quarterly national accounts,
from where information concerning GDP and main expenditure components, income, employment
and compensation is taken. The ESA95 version was considered, making also use of accounts based
13We have de￿ned the point of normalisation so that t0 = ￿ t , N0 = ￿ N . K0 = ￿ K , Y0 = ￿￿ Y and ￿0 = ￿ ￿ . Parameter ￿
is a normalization constant (close to unity) that resulting from nonlinearities the sample average of production need not
exactly coincide with the level of production implied by the sample averages of inputs and time, Klump et al. (2007).31
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on SNA79 in order to back-date variables. Eurostat is also the source for the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Price Indexes and sub-components. In this case the back-dating of variables was based on
Consumer Price Indexes.
As concerns ￿nancial variables, 3-month EURIBOR was used as the short-term interest rate mea-
sure and the 10-year bond yields as the long-term one. For stock prices the most representative indexes
are considered (i.e. DAX for Germany, Ibex for Spain, Amsterdam AEX for Netherlands and MIB for
Italy). Other variables like house prices or capital stock are based on internal calculations undertaken
within the Eurosystem. The construction of world demand and competitors exports and import price
variables is described in Hubrich and Karlsson (2010). Moreover, time series for a large number of
model variables have been created applying model identities/de￿nitions.
8.2 Estimation of the supply system
The steady state form of the ￿rst-order conditions of the pro￿t maximising ￿rm and unions maximising
the utility of member households imply the 5-equation medium-run supply system (76)-(80) that allows
a consistent two-step estimation of the underlying deep parameters of the model. As the supply
system contains cross-equation parameter constraints, it is estimated with the method of non-linear
SUR, see Le￿n-Ledesma et al. (2009), and which has proven to be a very e¢ cient estimation approach
outperforming all single-equation methods.
In estimating the system (76)-(80) we also studied whether, instead of developing smoothly over
the sample period, there were breaks in the speed of factor augmenting technical progress to capture
the e⁄ect of the IT-boom. We found that in all countries, except in Germany and the Netherlands,
there were shifts in technical progress from the labour augmenting towards the capital augmenting
progress around the years 1996-1997. Likewise to improve the data compatibility of the system we
also allowed breaks in the trends of mark-up and normal working hours per employee.
According to our estimation results, capital augmentation was the dominating form of technical
progress in all ￿ve countries, especially in the latter part of our estimation period, indeed, both
the German and Dutch data favoured solely capital augmenting technical progress over the whole
estimation period. Also in line with observed deceleration of labour productivity growth the curvature
parameter estimates of ￿i were below unity indicating gradually decelerating growth contributions of
technical progress. The estimates of the key technology parameter, the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour are shown below. They are uniformly in all countries close to 0.6 implying
a stark deviation from the unit elasticity of the Cobb Douglas production function. This has important
implications to of the transmission mechanism of the whole model, where the elasticity of substitution
is one of the key parameters.
Production Function Estimates















81q2 93q1 87q1 83q1 81q1
* Standard errors of estimates in brackets.
This system de￿nes the parameters related to technology, production function and the mark-up
allowing to de￿ne optimal frictionless prices, wages, labour demand and marginal cost and product
concepts needed in estimating in the second stage the dynamic ￿rst order optimisation conditions of
￿rms and unions.32
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8.3 Dynamic Equation Estimation
All dynamic equations containing the leads of variables are estimated by the generalised method of
moment (GMM), Hansen (1982). GMM is a limited information method that can be applied without a
full statistical speci￿cation of all variables of the model as should be the case in applying some variant
of the full information maximum likelihood method (FIML). It is, however, able to solve the problem
of serially correlated errors resulting from the replacement of expectations by actual realisations in
estimated speci￿cations. Therefore, in the present context, where optimizing agents are assumed to
be boundedly rational in knowing only the parameters related to their problem but not necessarily the
rest of the model, GMM is an especially appealing estimation method. As a partial, single equation
method, GMM is not quite as e¢ cient as FIML but, as opposed to FIML estimates, GMM estimates
are not contaminated by possible misspeci￿cations in the rest of the model.
Hence, GMM is an estimation technique based on minimal assumptions which does not require us
to specify an explicit process for the underlying driving variables instead an instrument set is used for
the expected variables without referring to the structure of the process driving the forcing variable.
This then enables us to e¢ ciently and consistently estimate the deep parameters of the economic
model together with their associated standard errors.
As the model is primarily to be used for forecasting and simulation, the approach to estimation
was to put a stronger weight on more recent data compared to historical data. This was achieved by
starting with a short sample for the dynamic equations, and then rolling the sample back to ensure
no structural breaks. The table below records the starting sample for the dynamic equations. End
period is 2007Q2 for all equations.
Estimation Sample
EquationsnCountry FR DE IT ES NL
Investment 83q1 93q1 89q1 93q1 84q1
Employment 82q3 93q1 92q1 86q1 93q1
Consumption 88q1 82q1 91q1 91q1 83q1
Wages 83q4 91q1 91q1 90q1 85q1
In￿ ation 84q4 93q1 93q1 93q1 91q1
Inventories 82q2 82q1 90q1 88q1 88q2
Real exports 85q1 91q1 92q1 93q1 87q1
Real imports 85q1 82q1 85q2 84q1 85q2
Export prices 85q1 91q1 92q1 93q1 87q1
Import prices 85q1 91q1 85q2 84q1 85q2
Below we report the key estimated equations and parameters, and where relevant the roots of the
equations, where the closer to unity they are the more forward/backward looking is the behaviour.
In the Appendix we report the instruments used and the normalized equation parameters for the
forward-looking equations.
8.3.1 Labour Demand
From the point of view of employment, the desired (optimal) number of workers is derived from the
inverted production function equation (71) such that:
N￿
t =
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Changes in employment are coupled with adjustment costs. For estimation of the dynamic labour







Now the dynamic system of ￿rst order conditions imply the following labour demand:
nt =
Dt
(1 + Dt + ah=aN)
nt+1 +
1
(1 + Dt + ah=aN)
nt￿1 +
ah=aN

















2￿￿ = discounting factor (￿ 1)
The estimated parameters and the implied roots of the homogenous part of the di⁄erence equation
are presented in the table below. In all cases the backward root is high implying slow adjustment to
shocks. However, also the inverse of forward roots are quite high, although well below unity, implying
forward lookingness in labour demand. Spain is both the least backward and least forward looking
country implying demand for labour is more a⁄ected by contemporaneous e⁄ects.
Labour Demand Estimation results
FR DE IT ES NL
ah=aN 0.0225 0.0388 0.0559 0.1414 0.0396
(0.004) (0.011) (0.020) (0.037) (0.008)
1/Root 1 (forward) 0.8564 0.8171 0.7855 0.6848 0.8173
Root 2 (backward) 0.8646 0.8248 0.7932 0.6904 0.8219
p-value of J-test 0.85 0.974 0.84 0.839 0.955
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
8.3.2 Capital formation
Capital accumulation re￿ ects time-to-build considerations. In addition to conventional demand and
technology constraints the present value maximisation is constrained by non-negativity of gross in-
vestment and by the upper bound for the debt-to capital stock ratio. Hence, the estimated aggregate
level equations assume that for a certain percent of ￿rms these constraints are binding.








￿ ￿Kt￿1￿kt￿1 ￿ aKbK ￿ ￿Kt￿kt￿1 (84)
where k = logK and bK 2 [0; 1].
Now the dynamic system of ￿rst order conditions implies the investment equation:34
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￿B = LG-multiplier related to the borrowing constraint; ￿= the debt to capital stock ceiling ratio
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; MPK = marginal product of capital; UC = real user cost of capital; ￿I= LG-multiplier
related to the irreversibility of investment ; and aK and bK are adjustment cost parameters.
The estimated parameters and implied roots are reported in the table below. In all cases the
backward root (which equals parameter bk) is high implying slow adjustment to shocks, however
￿rms are also forward-looking. From the roots, we see that Spain is the most forward looking and the
Netherlands the least forward looking.
Total investment has been further disaggregated via bridge equations to housing (incorporating
short/long-term interest rates), and non-residential, but all feedback e⁄ects to the rest of the model
go through aggregate ￿xed investment.
Estimated Investment parameters￿
FR DE IT ES NL
1 ￿ ￿B 0.5087 0.4517 0.5067 0.5876 0.376
(0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
bK 0.7879 0.695 0.7796 0.7834 0.6267
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.026)
1=aK 0.0126 0.0122 0.0129 0.0139 0.0163
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0016)
￿I 0.25 0.26 0.2 0.25 0.33
￿ 0.8 0.8 0.855 0.8 0.75
1/Root 1 (forward) 0.3961 0.311 0.3918 0.4585 0.2306
1/Root 2 (forward) 0.5027 0.4475 0.5026 0.5852 0.3679
Root 3 (backward) 0.7879 0.695 0.7796 0.7834 0.6267
p-value of J-test 0.999 0.999 0.99 0.996 0.993
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
8.3.3 Price formation
Price setting are staggered with three-valued Calvo-signal resulting in a conventional hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve as in Gali and Gertler (1999); see equation (54) without quadratic in￿ ation
terms:
f￿p + !p [1 ￿ ￿p (1 ￿ ￿)]g￿pt ￿ !p￿pt￿1 ￿ ￿￿p￿pt+1
￿ (1 ￿ !p)(1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ ￿￿p)(p￿
t ￿ pt) = 0 (86)35
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where pt = log of gdp de￿ ator at factor costs; p￿
t = wt ￿ mpnt + ah (n￿
t ￿ nt) + ￿t = log of the
frictionless equilibrium price level; wt = log of compensation per worker; mpnt= log of the marginal
product of labour (<= production function); n￿
t = optimal number of workers (log), nt = actual
employment (log); ah is the overtime premium parameter determined by (46) and aggregate mark-up
￿(t) is determined by the system (76)-(80). ￿p is the probability that ￿rms don￿ t change their prices,
and !p is the probability that prices are changed following a backward-looking rule.
For Germany and Spain the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve was estimated as in McAdam
and Willman (2004) in the following present value form:
￿pt = !p￿pt￿1 +






i Et (mcnt+i + ￿ ￿ pt￿1) + const (87)
Estimated parameters of the hybrid NKPC￿
FR DE IT ES NL
￿p 0.7455 0.7646 0.7251 0.6705 0.6926
(0.030) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.043)
!p 0.3531 0.3831 0.3235 0.2543 0.2807
(0.045) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.054)
ah 0.7515 0.399 0.1797 0.4212 0.4109
(0.237) (0.214) (0.222) (0.204) (0.156)
Duration 3.93 4.25 3.64 3.03 3.25
1/Root 1 (forward) 0.7380 1.321 0.7179 0.6638 0.6857
Root 2 (backwards) 0.597 0.6216 0.5712 0.5067 0.5298
Root 3 (backwards) 0.5914 0.6163 0.5663 0.502 0.5298
p-value of J-test 0.867 0.890 0.967 0.896 0.922
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
In estimation we assumed the four per cent annual discount rate, which in quarterly data implies
￿ = 0:99.
Our estimation results imply that the duration, i.e. the average time ￿rms keep prices ￿xed, is
between 3 ￿5 quarters. This range is somewhat shorter than the estimates of Gali and Gertler (1999)
and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), whose estimated average duration was 5 - 6 quarters,
and markedly below the estimates from DSGE models of the euro area14. Our results are, however,
strongly supported by a broad range of micro studies that suggest the average duration of price changes
in the Euro area ranges from four to ￿ve quarters, see `lvarez et al (2006) and Altissimo, Ehrmann
and Smets (2006). Some other studies suggest that average duration of price changes could be even
less than 4 quarters, e.g. Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), and Fabiani et al (2006) and
possibly less than 2 quarters Dias et al (2007). Given this evidence, we consider our estimates very
plausible.
Disaggregated Price Equations The GDP de￿ ator at factor costs is an integral part of the supply
side and the key determinant of other price variables in the model. In this regard, it is the central
price in the model. However, adjustment in other prices also matter for di⁄erences in the models￿
14For instance, Smets and Wouters (2003) estimates suggested prices change once every two and a half years and
Christo⁄el, Coenen and Warne (2008) estimations imply even longer duration.36
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response. Below we present the estimation results for Harmonized consumer price indices (HICP),
which are represented by two equations, one for the energy HICP and one for non-energy HICP.








t is the pre-tax HICP excluding energy, tci is the current implicit tax rate and tcir is the
tax rate in the base year of price indices. We model the seasonal adjusted version of pHXT
t , so-called
pHXST
t where the seasonal factors are estimated using a time-varying airline estimation procedure
and kept ￿xed over the forecast horizon. We retain the Calvo price framework and parameters from
above:












t is the long-run optimal non-energy HICP and is weighted average of the optimal
GDP de￿ ator p￿
t including indirect energy prices and imports de￿ ator excluding energy, pMN
t , where
the weights ￿1 are estimated by OLS and % is set to 0.015 based on input-output tables. In addition,
as with the Calvo price equation, we include a labour adjustment factor:
pHXST￿
t = ￿1pMN
t + (1 ￿ ￿1)((1 ￿ %)p￿
t + %pEI
t ) + ah (n￿
t ￿ nt) (90)
HICP energy (PHE
t ) is modelled as a mark-up of energy prices (or oil) and GDP de￿ ator (pt):
pHE
t = ￿1pEI
t + (1 ￿ ￿1)(pt) (91)
HICP energy and excluding energy and taxes seasonally adjusted
DE FR IT ES NL
￿1 0.21 0.15 0.1 0.033 0.17
(0.071) . (0.014) (0.005) (0.018)
￿1 0.33 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.35
(0.07) (0.098) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
The overall HICP pH
t ;then becomes a weighted average of HICP non-energy (post-tax), pHX
t and
HICP energy, pHE
t where wet is the weight of HICP energy in the overall HICP15.
pH
t = wet ￿ pHE
t + (1 ￿ wet) ￿ pHX
t (92)
The consumption de￿ ator is linked via a simple bridge equation to seasonally adjusted HICP.
All other domestic de￿ ators (e.g. investment de￿ ator) are speci￿ed as quasi-identities, i.e. modelled
as weighted averages of domestic costs (measured by the value-added de￿ ator de￿ned above) and
import prices (measured by the import de￿ ator). This feature ensures static homogeneity in all
price equations. For pre-tax de￿ ators we assume that imports are ￿ cost, insurance and freight at the
15In 2004 energy HICP weight varied across the countries in the range of 8-10 per cent37
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importer￿ s border￿(cif) and the exports are ￿ free on board at the exporter￿ s border￿(fob). For this
reason indirect taxes are levied only on total consumption (private and public) and total investment.
Since there is no distinction between indirect taxes on consumption goods and on investment goods,
both tax rates will be equal in sample but will be kept under di⁄erent denominations for simulation
purposes.
8.3.4 Wage Setting
As with the price setting, wages are also set via a staggered with three-valued Calvo-signal where part
of unions keep wages ￿xed, ￿w, another part changes wages following backward-looking rule, !w, and
the rest set them optimally16:
f￿w + !w [1 ￿ ￿w (1 ￿ ￿)]g￿wt = !w￿wt￿1 + ￿￿wEtwt+1
+ (1 ￿ !w)(1 ￿ ￿w)(1 ￿ ￿￿w)fw￿
t ￿ wtg
(93)
where wt = log of compensation per worker, and ￿; the discount factor, = 0:99. The optimal
frictionless wage rate, w￿
t is based on two alternative behavioural assumptions where we assume that
part of the unions are utilitarian, maximising the utility of member households, whist the rest are
non-utilitarian keeping wage development in line with productivity development coupled with a high
















































where ct = consumption (log), pC
t = consumption de￿ ator (log) ; F￿1 (￿) = inverted CES produc-
tion function ( desired number of workers); NF
t = labour force and the gap between optimal labour
demand and supply measures the wage drift e⁄ect.
Note that if all unions are non-utilitarian, then in the full model context, it implies a constant
long-run natural rate of unemployment. If instead, all or part of the unions are utilitarian, then shocks
that a⁄ect the demand structure, e.g. a permanent government expenditure shock a⁄ecting the GDP
share of private consumption, a⁄ect also the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate.
The weight parameter awu is estimated in the context of the estimation of equation (93). Naturally,
for scenario analysis its value can be imposed to unity or zero, depending if we want to assume all
unions to be utilitarian or non-utilitarian17.
16As for prices (see equation 87), in Germany we have followed the present value form of this equation.
17For the simulations in the paper we assume all unions to be non-utilitarian.38
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Estimated parameters of the hybrid wage-NKPC￿
FR DE IT ES NL
￿w 0.7364 0.7982 0.7301 0.7471 0.7077
(0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
!w 0.3396 0.4412 0.3306 0.3555 0.2999
(0.041) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) (0.029)
￿ 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.15 0.11
- - - - -
awu 0.3 0.15 0.5366 0.2234 0.1745
- - (0.049) (0.061) (0.048)
Duration 3.79 4.95 3.71 3.95 3.42
1/Root 1 (forward) 0.7290 0.7903 0.7228 0.7396 0.7006
Root 2 (backwards) 0.5591 0.6683 0.5769 0.5963 0.5488
Root 3 (backwards) 0.5561 0.6603 5730 0.5963 0.5465
p-value of J-test 0.914 0.844 0.912 0.775 0.983
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
In the table we report the average duration between wage changes. Estimated wage durations are
in all countries around 4 quarters. Existing information on the frequency of wage changes is rather
scarce, but recent ￿nding of the Wage Dynamic Network (2010) based on survey evidence suggested
average duration of wages is about 5 quarters, see Druant et al. (2009), compared to an average
duration of prices of slightly above 3 quarters. This ￿nding also seems consistent with estimates of
average contract length in collective wage agreements (of between one and 1.5 years). For the euro
area, DSGE models, both standard ones like Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christo⁄el, Coenen and
Warne (2008) and ones with more detailed labour markets e.g. De Walque et al (2010), ￿nd the
average duration of wage contracts is estimated to be just over one year. Hence, our estimates are
broadly within the range of estimates and similar to the price duration e⁄ects, Taylor (1999).
8.3.5 Inventory investment
Following general practice and to neglect excessive complexity of the pro￿t maximization framework,
inventory formation is left outside that framework. Instead inventory formation is derived on the
basis of second stage optimization by assuming that ￿rms minimise a quadratic loss function speci￿ed
in terms of the deviations of inventories from the optimal level, on one hand, and the deviations of
output (sales of storable goods) from the level corresponding to the optimal use of existing input.
The desired equilibrium inventory stock KII￿ is based on the estimated CES production function:
KII = a + bF (K;N;t) (96)
and inventories from the dynamic equation:
(1 ￿ r ￿ A)￿KIIt = (1 ￿ 2A)￿KII￿
t
￿ A[￿St ￿ ￿KIIt ￿ ￿F (￿)] + (1 ￿ r)A[￿St+1 ￿ ￿KIIt+1 ￿ ￿F (￿;t + 1)] (97)
S= Sales (Private consumption + exports)39
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Inventory Estimation results￿
FR DE IT ES NL
A 0.4705 0.3374 0.3501 0.3038 0.3802
(0.027) (0.032) (0.072) (0.058) (0.047)
1/Root 1 (forward) 0.7372 0.3855 0.4055 0.3361 0.4579
Root 2 (backward) 0.7447 0.3893 0.4096 0.3395 0.4625
p-value of J-test 0.731 0.889 0.92 0.972 0.987
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
Estimation results indicate that all 5-countries inventories show quite fast adjusted to their optimal
level. The adjustment process is fastest in Spain and slowest in France.
8.4 Households
The optimization framework of households is Blanchard￿ s (1985) overlapping generation model with
perpetual youth, where risk-averse consumers maximize their life-time utility under imperfect (front-
loaded) information accounting for internal habit formation. This results in a forward looking aggre-
gate consumption function with strong backward-looking frictional elements, see equation (23). In the
estimated speci￿cation we assume that the subjective discount rate ￿ = ￿ r = 0:01 (and ￿ R = (1 ￿ ￿ r)
￿1)
which corresponds to an annual rate of 4 percent. Further, to eliminate heteroscedasticity we divide
both sides of equations by current period labour income. Hence, in estimating the equation with the
method of instrumental variables it can be written as follows:
Et
8
> > > <
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= 0 (98)
where Ct is consumption, Yt labour income net of payroll taxes minus transfers, Vt￿1 total wealth
in the beginning of period. Parameter ￿= death probability; ￿= forward information parameter; a=
habit persistence parameter; ￿= income risk parameter, and zt refers to the set of instruments.
As ￿rms are owned by households, total private sector wealth can be used as operational counter-
party of Vt￿1 in (98). In a macroeconomic framework the advantage of this large wealth concept is
that its component corresponding to accumulated savings equals the sum of the private sector capital
stock (at repurchasing prices), net government debt GDN and net foreign assets NFA. However, as
also changes in real asset prices may a⁄ect the ￿perceived￿wealth relevant for consumption decisions,























where PI, PC , PS and PH are investment de￿ ator, consumption de￿ ator, stock prices and the
market price of housing, respectively. KSR is total capital stock, KGR is government sector capital
stock and sH is the share of housing stock of total private capital stock. Now, if elasticity parameters
b0 and b1 equal zero, then asset prices have no e⁄ects on consumption and ￿perceived￿wealth equals
total private sector wealth at repurchasing prices.40
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Correspondingly, if b0=b1=1, then variations in stock and housing prices are fully transmitted
into the ￿perceived￿wealth with maximal e⁄ects on consumption. These parameters were estimated
jointly with other parameters of the dynamic consumption function speci￿ed for the ￿ve biggest euro
area countries. In estimated equations b0 and b1 were constrained to be equal, because data was not
able to credibly identify possible di⁄erentiated elasticity e⁄ects. These equations implied the following
long-run marginal properties to consume out of wealth (mcrw) and labour income (mcry ) as well as
elasticity parameters (b0 and b1).
Consumption equation￿
FR DE IT ES NL
￿ 0.005 0.007 0.0053 0.0053 0.0053
￿ 0.8138 0.7923 0.6144 0.7192 0.6665
(0.138) (0.004) (0.055) (0.09) (0.052)
a 0.9303 0.8715 0.9467 0.864 0.9098
(0.036) (0.004) (0.012) (0.069) (0.013)
￿ 0.9031 0.8002 0.6711 0.8522 0.7196
(0.038) (0.004) (0.021) (0.017) (0.013)
b0,b1 - 0.2828 0.2036 0.2388 0.336
(0.024) (0.101) (0.1) (0.048)
mcrw 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
mcry 0.91 0.79 0.61 0.71 0.67
1/Root 1 (forward) 0.805 0.783 0.606 0.711 0.658
Root 2 (backward) 0.92 0.862 0.934 0.854 0.898
p-value of J-test 0.908 0.949 0.701 0.946 0.831
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
The long-run marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth is, according to these estimates,
7 cents per euro in Germany and 6 cents in the other four countries. Positive stock and housing
price e⁄ects on consumption were estimated for all countries except for France (where they were not
found to be signi￿cant). According to these estimates across countries, in the long-run about 20-34
percent of changes in stock and housing prices are transmitted to the respective wealth components
and further to consumption.
8.5 External Sector Behaviour
8.5.1 Export formation
Pro￿t maximisation under the AIDS type of export demand function results in the following 2-equation




) = a + b ￿ f(time) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(pX ￿ pCX) (100)
pX = a +
1 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
2 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
((1 ￿ ax)(w ￿ mpn) + axpM)
+
1
2 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
pCX (101)41
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Where PX = Export de￿ ator (lower case refers to log); X = Export volume; PCX= the external
competitor export prices (lower case refers to log); MF = the world demand for exports; w = com-
pensation per worker (log); mpn = marginal product of labour (log); pM = import de￿ ator (log), a =
point market share (with indexed data close to unity); ￿ > 1 is the representative point price elasticity
of exports; b if di⁄erent from zero measures the deviation of income elasticity of export demand from
unity; and aX = import content of exports (input-output estimate). In estimation an additional free
trend variable was allowed in the price equation.
2-equation export system estimates￿
DE FR IT ES NL
a 1.08 1.131 1.051 1.05 1.025
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ł 1.021 1.056 1.220 1.314 1.345
(0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
aX 0.385 0.167 0.400 0.465 0.672
Log-det -16.49 -16.83 -14.61 -16.65 -14.49
ADF volume-eq. -3.81 -4.954 -2.095 -3.16 -3.798
ADF price-eq. -3.735 -2.812 -2.918 -4.0 -2.482
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
The dynamic export volume and export price equations follow conventional error correction equa-
tions for the log change in exports or export prices.
Dynamic export equation estimates￿
DE FR IT ES NL
MF 0.846 0.745 0.663 0.68 0.926
(0.182) (0.11) (0.171) (0.186) (0.078)
PCX=PX -0.288 -0.239 -0.573 -0.399 -0.285
(0.154) (0.1) (0.093) (0.19) (0.087)
￿x￿
t￿1 - - - 0.271 -
(0.12)
EC ￿ term -0.152 -0.42 -0.157 -0.165 -0.088
(0.06) (0.06) (0.053) (0.091) (0.042)
R-square 0.41 0.559 0.486 0.281 0.378
D-W 2.218 1.948 1.775 1.873 2.174
Dynamic export price equation
￿Px￿ - 0.795 0.529 0.726 0.930
(0.082) (0.096) (0.097) (0.109)
￿Px￿
t￿1 - 0.177 - - -
(0.080)
￿Px




t￿3 0.1333 - - - -
(0.0353)
EC ￿ term -0.328 -0.097 -0.171 -0.548 -0.11
(0.054) (0.048) (0.061) (0.113) (0.049)
R-square 0.449 0.633 0.468 0.663 0.489
D-W 1.343 1.984 2.005 1.906 2.00242
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8.5.2 Import formation
As mentioned above, the modelling approach of imports is conventional where the import supply
curve is assumed to be horizontal and, hence, import volume is demand determined. Accordingly two
driving variables are the domestic demand indicator and the relative price of domestic production and
imports. The demand indicator eMR is the demand indicator for imports (import content weighted
index of domestic demand) derived from input-output tables:
Import Content of Demand
DE FR IT ES NL
Consumption 0.211 0.197 0.21 0.194 0.319
Investment 0.261 0.243 0.286 0.285 0.523
Government 0.056 0.076 0.055 0.075 0.107
Stocks 0.508 0.327 0.437 0.482 0.7
Exports 0.385 0.166 0.4 0.465 0.672
Hence, we specify the long-run equilibrium aggregate demand for imports to depend on the demand
indicator (with unit elasticity), the ratio of exports to the demand indicator and the relative domestic-
to-import price:
m￿ ￿ eMR = k(pMD ￿ pMN) + b(x ￿ eMR) (102)
PMD is domestic prices (gdp de￿ ator); and PMN is import prices excluding energy. All variables
in equation (102) are measured in logs. The dynamic equation follows a standard EC speci￿cation.
Import equation￿
DE FR IT ES NL
k -0.782 -0.711 -1.001 -0.979 -0.576
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
b 0.312 0.284 - 0.293 0.072
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.002)
Constant -0.772 -0.558 -0.47 0.223 -0.522
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
R-square 0.974 0.982 0.793 0.981 0.936
ADF -3.981 -3.704 -4.124 -3.207 -4.032
Dynamic Import equation
￿m￿ - 0.813 0.568 0.561 0.722
(0.1) (0.09) (0.08) (0.1)
￿mt￿2 - - 0.132 - -
(0.09)
￿eMR 0.642 - - - -
(0.08)
EC ￿ term -0.235 -0.121 -0.117 0.164 -0.229
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
R-square 0.446 0.402 0.339 0.394 0.35
D-W 1.825 1.644 1.901 1.827 2.098
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
Import price equation The equation for the import de￿ ator excluding energy is also quite tra-
ditional. It depends on the GDP de￿ ator net of indirect taxes, TX, to capture possible pricing to
market e⁄ects, and the competitors￿import price pCM with static homogeneity condition imposed43
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pMN = ￿1(p + log(1 ￿ TX1)) + (1 ￿ ￿1)pCM (103)
In addition a trend term was included. The dynamic equation follows a standard EC speci￿cation.
Import price (excluding energy equation)￿
DE FR IT ES NL
￿1 0.333 0.416 0.225 0.312 0.667
1 ￿ ￿1 0.667 0.584 0.775 0.688 0.333
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R-square 0.957 0.99 0.77 0.991 0.405
D-W 0.561 0.296 0.389 0.741 0.359
Dynamic Import price equation
￿p￿
MN 0.498 0.673 0.427 0.669 0.74
(0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18)
￿p￿
MN;t￿1 0.344 0.237 - - -
(0.08) (0.14)
￿p￿
MN;t￿2 0.179 - - - -
(0.07)
￿pMN;t￿1 - 0.189 0.158 - 0.26
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
EC ￿ term -0.118 -0.148 -0.235 -0.417 -0.16
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
R-square 0.649 0.487 0.243 0.375 0.30
D-W 1.978 2.167 1.968 2.053 2.039
￿Standard errors of estimates in brackets
The trade balance and net factor income equal the current account balance, which in turn is
cumulated to give the stock of net foreign assets. Disaggregated trade (intra and extra) imports,
exports both real and prices are modelled via bridge equations.
8.6 Government, Central Banks and Financial Markets
We close the model with the inclusion of the Central Bank which sets monetary policy, governments
with a ￿scal policy reaction function, and ￿nancial markets which are forward-looking and determine
exchange rates and long-term interest rates. Although the activation of a monetary policy rule, a ￿scal
policy rule and an exchange rate UIP rule is required for long-run stability, there are scenarios where
the model can be simulated when these aspects are exogenised (e.g. under a scenario of monetary
accommodation).
8.6.1 Governments
The ￿scal block of the model comprises a set of identities in expenditure and revenue categories.
Government receipts are split into a number of components: direct taxes on households earned income
(Tf) which includes social contributions split into employers ￿ and employee￿ s and is determined via
a ￿scal rule (see below); direct taxes on ￿rms (To), and indirect taxes (TI), which include VAT
and excises duties are calculated as exogenous implicit tax rates, and other public income (OIG),
which includes the gross operating surplus. On the expenditure side, the ￿scal authority has (net)
transfers (TRF), which includes pensions and unemployment payments. As these vary signi￿cantly44
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over the business cycle, transfers as a proportion of nominal GDP (tr) are modelled as a function of the
unemployment rate, mainly re￿ ecting the dependency of unemployment compensation to unemployed:
TRF = tr:PY ￿ {W(N ￿ Nbas) (104)
where { is calibrated to 0.7. This means transfers are counter-cyclical - increasing with the
unemployment rates. In addition, the ￿scal authority has net interest payments on government debt
(ING) and di⁄erent types of primary expenditure categories, namely, government consumption (GN)
and government investment (ING) which are exogenous in real terms but can be shocked as part of a
￿scal policy expansion. Finally, the government consumption de￿ ator follows both the price of home
produced goods with a weight of ￿
G and of imported goods with a weight of (1-￿
G) .
The public de￿cit (D) each period is then the di⁄erence between the receipts and expenditures:
D = TF + To + TI + OIG ￿ TFF ￿ ING ￿ GN ￿ ING (105)
The ￿scal authority￿ s is faced by a budget constraint which says that public debt Bt is the cumu-
lative sum of past public de￿cits (D) i.e.
Bt = Bt￿1 + Dt (106)
As households are non-Ricardian, the path of government debt and taxes matter for the evolution
of the economy. Therefore, governments aim to insure stability of the public debt stock. This is
modelled via a ￿scal policy rule based on a reaction of personal income taxes to the deviation of the
government￿ s debt to GDP ratio from its predetermined target and which contributes to adjustment
towards the stock-￿ ow equilibrium in the long-run.18
￿￿t = ’1(bt￿1 ￿ b) + ’2￿bt￿1 (107)
where ￿t is the personal income tax rate (TF=Y ), and bt is the government debt to GDP ratio
(B/Y), and b is the target. The parameters ’1and ’2 are set at 0.003 and 0.03 respectively.
8.6.2 Monetary Authority
Households and ￿rms adjust their plans by taking into account the expected response by monetary
authorities. The endogenous monetary policy rule provides the nominal anchor to the model and
incorporate a smooth interest rate reaction to shocks in the short-run. The monetary policy rule
follows a simple Taylor rule speci￿cation as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), in which the short
term interest rate is determined by the in￿ ation gap, where the in￿ ation gap measures the distance
between the actual in￿ ation rate and its target level and the output gap (yt￿￿ yt) along with the lagged
interest e⁄ect. This monetary policy rule means that the interest rate converges towards its long term
target as in￿ ation converges and the output gap closes. For the purpose of the simulations this target
level of in￿ ation (￿^ ￿ pt) is set to 2 per cent per annum, but it could, in principle, be set to any other
reasonable level.
it = (1 ￿ 0:25) ￿ it￿1 + 0:25 ￿ (4 ￿ 1:5 ￿ (￿pt+1 ￿ ￿^ ￿ pt) + 0:5 ￿ (yt ￿ ￿ yt)) + "t (108)
where it is the nominal interest rate and "t is a serially uncorrelated shock to the interest rate.
Regarding the choice of parameters, they are calibrated on the basis of available relevant estimates
18As the focus in the govenment sector stability target is more in the long than short-run and to strengthen the short
run e⁄ects of ￿scal policy, the ￿scal policy reaction function could have longer lags from the debt ratio to the change of
the income tax rate, but this would also increase the cyclicality of the model.45
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in the literature and with the view of ensuring a sensible pro￿le of the models￿dynamic behaviour19.
In particular, the parameter governing the speed of reaction to the interest rate gap is set to 0.25.
Following general convention, the in￿ ation gap and output gap parameters are set to 1.5 and 0.5
respectively.
8.6.3 Financial Markets
Financial markets are forward-looking. The speci￿cation of the long-term interest rate equation is:
lt = 0:9 ￿ lt+1 + 0:1 ￿ it (109)
The exchange rate follows a standard real UIP equation:
et = et+1 + (r
f
t ￿ rt)=400 (110)
where e is the (log of) the real exchange rate and rt and r
f
t are the domestic and foreign real interest
rates respectively.
9 Rational Expectations
We are able to simulate the model under di⁄erent expectation formations, but in this paper we
consider the case where expectations are assumed to be fully model consistent forward-looking, rational
expectations, where the expected value is simply replaced by the model future realisations and the
model solved iteratively, such that the expectations are fully model consistent. This means that
agents, both private and government, are able to re-optimize his or her behaviour in advance taking
into account the past, current and future anticipated shocks hitting the economy. Hence, expected
outcomes are replaced with model outcomes i.e:
ye
t+1 = yt+1 (111)
We solve the model in a deterministic framework,20 so that there is full information, and perfect
foresight. Given that the model has signi￿cant non-linearities, we use a stacked-time Newton-Raphson
algorithm where we can use a partially solved-out version as the whole model is essentially written in
terms of observables. This approach has the advantage of not needing to explicitly linearize the model,
and is therefore accurate when the economies are not operating close to the steady-state (e.g. during
the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2009)21 and is fast and robust compared to many ￿rst-order algorithms, see
Juillard et al (1998).22 However, one drawback of this approach is that the terminal conditions must
be explicitly speci￿ed. We use the baseline terminal condition approach which is used because we
know the economy was in a form of state at that point. Therefore, for each country we considered the
last value (e.g. 2007Q2) to correspond with the long-run steady state solution of the model and, hence,
the baseline scenario should not be considered a projection. Solving the model produces a transitional
(medium-run) steady state solution for the model variables, i.e. these variables will vary over time
19In principle, a more re￿ned approaches could be utilized here, for instance direct estimation.
20The shocks considered are deterministic, but the model is estimated more in the stochastic framework therefore
future research will explore the implications of stochastic simulations.
21There are no theorems that show that the extended Kalman ￿lter will convergence to the true nonlinear ￿lter even in
a ￿rst-order solution. Indeed, as Atolia et al (2010)) show, the further an economy is from its steady-state equilibrium,
the larger are the errors generated by linearization, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
22There have been many recent advances in stochastic solutions methods ￿see e.g. Aruoba et al (2006), Anderson
(2010), and Kollmann et al (2010).46
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due to the fact that movements from one point to another are not instantaneous. Furthermore, our
approach is motivated by the understanding that the e⁄ects of the terminal condition on the solution
at the beginning of the simulation fade out, if the solution period is lengthened far enough in the
future (Roeger and in￿ t Veld (1997)). To ensure this, we run the simulations over a long horizon ￿300
years. Given recent technological advances, the computational time is small, and tests on this model
show that there is e⁄ectively no impact of increasing this time-horizon. By simulating over such a long
horizon we are able to ensure the convergence of the model solution back to its baseline steady state
(temporary shocks) or to a new long-run steady state (permanent shocks) well before the end of the
simulation period. Indeed, the stability properties of the NMCM are good re￿ ected by the fact that
the model converges to a steady-state typically within around 40 years. As we ignore the solution
after 80 years, then little is lost by our choice of terminal conditions even in cases where the new
steady state deviates from the baseline steady-state.23 Indeed, one of the key aspects of the model,
is that long-run relationship between variables exist, and are explicitly modelled and that we allow
feed-back from the short-run to the steady-state.24 However, further testing of alternative terminal
conditions needs to be performed to study the impact on the steady-state.
This forward-looking approach addresses the Lucas critique, but probably does it in an unreal-
istically strict way. In this respect, we leave to our sister paper (Dieppe, Gonzalez Pandiella, Hall
and Willman 2011) a more detailed analysis of alternative model-consistent expectation formation by
exploring the implication of replacing rational expectations with learning and studying the impact of
changes in the structure of the economy, e.g. changes in agents beliefs and changes in various struc-
tural parameters. In the sister paper we are also able to relax the assumption in the simulations below
that all agents (household, ￿rms, unions, central banks, and governments) have the same information
set.
10 Indicative Simulations
We have highlighted the important role of economic theory in identifying the distinction between
short-run and long-run e⁄ects in a model. However it is key to see how the whole system works
and to assess the di⁄erences across countries. Given the homogeneous theoretical speci￿cation, we
would expect that the trajectories of the shocks should be similar across the countries, however
di⁄erences will arise from di⁄erent parameter estimates (re￿ ecting di⁄erent structural or economic
factors), di⁄erent initial states of the economy, and from di⁄erent adjustment speeds. This combines
into complex dynamic structures. However, by looking at the roots of the equations (i.e. the degree of
forward/backward lookingness) as well as the adjustments of the economy to fundamentals, we are able
to provide a framework to interpret the simulations. For example, if a country is more forward-looking,
then typically this implies quicker adjustment, whereas backward-looking behaviour re￿ ecting frictions
implies that shock e⁄ects are more persistent, i.e. distributed over a longer period and potentially leads
to hump shaped adjustment paths. In this section we undertake a range of simulations to highlight
the properties of the model for scenario and policy analysis. These simulations are not intended to
provide a comprehensive account of the model￿ s multipliers but are only indicative. Indeed, the model
could be used to analyse many types of structural shocks, or even direct shocks to expectations.
The model can be run under alternative assumptions concerning response of interest rates, ex-
change rates, budgetary policy etc. In this paper we focus on the Autarky (single country) case,
where the rest of the world is exogenous, namely: world demand and prices, world interest rates, and
23Given that we ignore the simulations after 80 years, we ￿x the interest rate 100 years ahead.
24Many DSGE model are done as deviations from some ad hoc trend. A mis-speci￿ed trend will generate bias in
estimation (Cogley (2001), Gorodnichenko and Ng (2010)).47
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oil prices25. Futhermore there are no cross-country linkages and monetary policy and exchange rates
react to country developments. The ￿scal rule (107) is in action but government consumption and
investment follow in real terms exogenously determined paths, and other government expenditures
remain constant as a share of GDP.
In this section we consider a variety of shocks. The ￿rst is an interest rate shock which informs
us about the transmission of monetary policy within the NMCM. We then consider a permanent
demand side shock, namely a permanent increase in government spending. Finally, we consider a
permanent supply side shock ￿a technology shock ￿both labour or capital augmenting. These shocks
thus explore temporary, permanent demand and permanent supply shocks. In addition we report an
exchange rate and a world demand shock. In all cases the shocks and simulations start in 2010q1.
We start by considering an unanticipated shock starting at time t. As forward-looking agents
don￿ t anticipate the initial shock, there is no reactions before the shock materialises, but under the
assumption of full-information, perfect foresight, and given the announcement is fully credible, rational
agents are able to fully anticipate the subsequent behaviour of the economy, and future expectations are
fully aligned with the outcome (i.e. fully model consistent). We assume that all sectors have the same
information set in forming expectations. Although, this assumption of perfect foresight is extreme,
these simulations will be a benchmark for simulations with alternative expectation assumptions and
enable us to isolate the implication of relaxing this assumption.
We consider 5 shocks occurring at 2010q1:
1. Short-term interest rate shock - de￿ned as a 50 b.p. increase in the short-term interest rate for
1 period followed by an interest rate rule.
2. Permanent Government expenditure shock ￿ speci￿ed as a 0.5% of GDP increase in public
consumption over the entire simulation horizon.
3. Technology (TFP) shock such that potential output is up by 0.1% over the entire horizon.
4. Permanent appreciation of the euro nominal exchange rate by 5% against all foreign currencies
5. Permanent World demand shock of 1% increase in extra euro area import demand.
The simulations are presented in the ￿gures at the end of the paper, where the results are presented
as deviations from baseline, (real variables and employment are expressed as percentages deviations;
prices as di⁄erences in year-on-year in￿ ation rates and for interest rates, savings ratio, ￿scal de￿cit,
and unemployment, they are expressed as absolute deviations, either in percentage points or percent of
GDP). We present results for the 5 estimated countries and consider the mechanisms and implications
for the 5 shocks in turn.
10.1 Short-term interest rate shock
This simulation is where the central bank announces a one-o⁄ increase in the short-term interest rate
of 50 b.p. for 1 period, and thereafter will revert to previous behaviour - i.e. interest rates will
subsequently follow the Taylor rule.
The transmission of monetary policy operates through a number of channels. First, via a change
in real exchanges rates - due to the real UIP, which impacts both import prices and competitiveness.
Initially the exchange rate appreciates to make possible future depreciation in anticipation of future
decreases in the interest rate. This exchange rate e⁄ect damages competitiveness and, therefore,
25Endogenisation of these variables would require an global model.48
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the trade balance. Secondly, monetary policy a⁄ects the user-cost of capital, whereby, long-term
interest rates follow the term structure - and hence the average of future short-term interest rates.
This raises the user cost of productive and residential capital, thereby acting as a depressant on ￿rm
and housing investment. Thirdly, households are directly a⁄ected due to higher discount rate, and
by intertemporal substitution e⁄ects where savings and future consumption become more attractive.
Another channel is that net interest payments are also a⁄ected for ￿rms, households and governments.
Finally, expectations play a key role in all of this; for example households are already in the ￿rst period
a⁄ected by expected lower wage growth which immediately decreases their consumption expenditure.
The combined e⁄ect of all this is a reduction in ￿nal demand as ￿rms reduce output and thus,
the demand for factors of production. This depresses prices, and combined with lower employment
creation, causes lower wages and lower household income. The lower demand decreases imports,
alleviating somewhat the downward pressures on GDP. As capital becomes relatively more expensive
than labour and as labour has a smaller adjustment cost than capital then ￿rms reduce employment.
Interest rates only gradually adjust down following a one period shock due to interest rate smoothing.
Therefore, the price e⁄ect is relatively large as agents realise that the shock to interest rates takes
time to unwind. However, lower prices starts to lead to gains in competitiveness, which combined
with improvements in productivity results in output growth returning to its previous level, halting
the decrease in in￿ ation. Overall, a temporary shock to short-term interest rate leads to a temporary
fall in real GDP but a more gradual decrease in the price level. After 5 years, interest rates are nearly
back to base.
The di⁄erences across countries are due to the di⁄erent structures of their economies, and re￿ ect
the di⁄erent estimated parameters, e.g. the speed of adjustments of factor demands and the extent
to which agents are forward-looking. Indeed, there are some notable di⁄erences, both in terms of
timing, and especially, the size of the interest rate shock impact across the countries. On the real side,
the largest e⁄ect is for Spain and Italy re￿ ecting partly stronger real interest rate e⁄ects and high
interest rate sensitivity of investment, but also re￿ ecting that ￿rms investment decisions are estimated
to be more forward-looking than in other countries. For all countries there is also signi￿cant habit
persistence in households. In France consumption is least dependent on current income and wealth,
instead, on long lags and leads of income formation. The timing and size of the in￿ ation reaction
also di⁄ers across countries. These can be explained by the speci￿c estimation results. On the price
side, the more ￿ exible prices are, that is, the larger the part of price setters who change prices in a
given period, the larger is the in￿ ation response. Indeed, the speed of price adjustment towards its
equilibrium also seems to explain the relative price responses. Spain changes their prices the most
often, (on average every 3 quarters) implying a quicker in￿ ation response. Wage behaviour also plays
a key role, where, for instance, in Spain we ￿nd high indexation of nominal wages to prices.
The introduction of model-consistent, forward-looking behaviour leads to quick initial reactions
even though the model contains quite a number of rigidities. This is in slight contrast to the studies
conducted under the ESCB￿ s Monetary Transmission Network (MTN)26 or DSGE models e.g. Smets
and Wouters (2003), or Christo⁄el et al (2008), which suggest that the maximum decline in output
is reached after about four quarters. As we see in our sister paper, changing the expectations to
learning add some additional delay to the output responses. However, as with VAR models of Euro
area monetary transmission, e.g. Peersman and Smets (2001), or DSGEs (Smets and Wouters 2003 or
Christo⁄el et al 2008), we ￿nd a relatively large investment reaction across countries, which is between
2 to 3 times larger than the GDP response, whereas consumption responds less. The MTN ￿ndings
suggest that transmission mechanisms in the individual countries are similar in broad terms (as we
also ￿nd), but the evidence from the literature on cross-country responses to a monetary shock show
26See Angeloni et al (2003) for a summary.49
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1315
April 2011
large, policy-independent, heterogeneity (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2003).
Van Els et al (2001) did a comparative analysis based on euro area macroeconometric models.
Although their simulation design was di⁄erent, the relative size of maximum output losses in response
to a monetary policy shock was the same as in the NMCM, with Netherlands and France having the
smallest output losses, and Italy and Spain having the largest, but this ￿nding is di⁄erent to some
SVAR analysis (e.g. Clements et al (2001) and Ehrmann (1998)).
10.2 Permanent Government expenditure shock
This can be considered as an unanticipated but credible announcement of an immediate and permanent
increase in government spending of 0.5% of GDP.
The increase in demand leads directly to an increase in employment. Firms initially increase
their investment, re￿ ecting a positive accelerator e⁄ect. The non-Ricardian households also observe
the increase in their current income, however, the increase in government spending leads to a less
favourable government ￿nancial position which needs to be ￿nanced. This is only partially done by
a reduction in government transfers to households because of lower unemployment. The ￿scal rule
employed in the model, will mean households will be a⁄ected by higher tax rates in order to bring
the Government debt as a share of GDP back to normal. Therefore, households will have less future
disposable income and will consequently reduce their current consumption. Employees will also pass
on part of the tax burden to employers by negotiating higher wages. This will, to some extent, mitigate
the tax e⁄ects. On impact, GDP increase by only around 0.5%.
This stronger demand puts upward pressure on prices and wages. The main transmission from a
positive demand shocks to prices is via marginal costs directly a⁄ecting the hybrid new Keynesian price
and wage Phillips curves and so unions respond to declining unemployment by increasing their wage
demands and ￿rms respond by increasing prices. Further pressure on wages is due to the increase in
tax rates which aim to ensure sustainability of government ￿nances. Through the increase in in￿ ation,
domestic producers become less competitive, so exports tend to decrease and imports increase, leading
to a worsening trade balance. Furthermore, the higher marginal costs, and higher in￿ ation, drives up
the interest rates which subsequently has a negative impact on investment and puts further downward
pressure on consumption. There is also a persistent increase in domestic price level that implies that
part of increased government consumption is absorbed by lower exports. After around 5 years of
increased government spending, GDP and in￿ ation return to baseline levels.
The main di⁄erences across countries come from di⁄erent estimated speeds of adjustment of wages
and prices as well as di⁄erent frictions associated with adjustment to factor demands by ￿rms, and
the behaviour of unions and households. Price and wage dynamics are essential to explaining these
di⁄erences. According to these simulation, France and Netherlands show the quickest price responses.
10.3 Technology shock
In addition to the demand shock we consider a supply shock in the form of permanent technology
shocks. As we have a CES production function we consider a shock both to labour augmenting and
capital augmenting technical progress, such that in both cases the (ceteris paribus) e⁄ect on potential
output is 0.1% ￿i.e. with the baseline amounts of capital and labour the economy could produce 0.1%
more output.
Broadly taken the e⁄ects of both technology shocks are very similar on most variables. Impact
and short-run e⁄ects on GDP are below 0.1% in all countries except in Spain, where the impact e⁄ect
is just above 0.1, however, thereafter falling below that level. The incomplete short-run transmission50
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of the shocks to output re￿ ects negative short-run labour demand responses to both shocks, i.e.
positive supply e⁄ects are partly crowded out. In the technology shock literature negative employment
responses to technology shocks are quite generally interpreted as a new Keynesian feature re￿ ecting
price stickiness. Cantore et al. (2010), however, showed that from the point of view of this result
costly adjustment of investment played a markedly more crucial role. They also showed that, although
the impact response employment to a capital augmented shock was positive with close enough to zero
values of substitution elasticity between capital and labour, this impact could be negative well below
unity value of substitution elasticity when coupled with positive adjustment costs of investment. That
is also what our simulation results depict. Hence, short-run employment responses to both capital
and labour augmenting shocks are negative and di⁄erences in the e⁄ects of these two technology
shocks are more quantitative than qualitative. The labour augmenting shock result in larger negative
employment and positive investment e⁄ects than the capital augmenting shock. Positive real wage
and consumption e⁄ects, in turn, are larger in response to the capital augmenting shock. Hence, as
the well known implication of the CES production function with labour augmenting technical progress
is the constancy of equilibrium factor income shares, the higher real wage and the lower capital stock
response to the capital augmenting shock than to the labour augmenting shock in our simulations
imply that in the long run the capital augmenting shock raises the equilibrium labour income share.
This is fully in line with the discussion, for example, by Acemoglu (2009) that capital augmenting
technical progress favours labour income (capital income), if the elasticity of substitution is below
(above) unity.
10.4 Permanent Exchange rate shock
This is a permanent appreciation of the euro nominal exchange rate by 5% against all foreign curren-
cies.
In the short-run, the main transmission channel is due to a decrease in competitiveness, leading to
lower exports to countries outside the euro area but also higher imports. However the weaker demand
for domestically produced goods and lower import prices has a de￿ ationary price e⁄ect leading to
lower interest rates. With some wage rigidities, this has the consequence of boosting real consumption
due to higher income. Gradually the lower prices erode the competitiveness losses, and combined with
a more relaxed monetary policy, the economies gradually return to their baseline levels of output and
in￿ ation. However, as the shock is a nominal shock, it has no long-run e⁄ects on the real variables,
but prices settle down to permanently lower levels.
In the short-run, the cross-country di⁄erences mainly re￿ ect the sensitivity of net exports to
changes in competitiveness and in particular the speed of the exchange rate pass-through to competi-
tors prices.
10.5 Permanent World demand shock
The last diagnostic simulation is a permanent foreign demand shock which is a 1% increase in extra
euro area import demand.
Higher foreign demand directly increases exports. There are cross-country di⁄erences which mainly
depend on the exposure of the countries to the rest of the world, with Germany and Netherlands
having the largest initial positive GDP e⁄ects due to a large export trade market. Higher demand
also boosts imports, which is conditional on the import context of exports. Higher demand also boosts
employment, lowering unemployment which increases wage demands and production prices leading
to in￿ ationary pressures and hence monetary tightening. One would expect other changes in the51
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1315
April 2011
international environment, e.g. foreign interest rate changes, but in this scenario we assume that all
other foreign variables are unchanged, which perhaps is not so realistic.
10.6 Pre-announced (anticipated) shocks
In the previous section we considered an unexpected and unanticipated (not pre-announced) events
hitting the economy. As the initial shock was not pre-announced at time t, there is no reactions
before the shock materialises. However at time t the future path is announced, and providing the
announcement is credible then under rational expectations, forward-looking agents can anticipate the
consequences right from the start of the shock, i.e. agents know the future interest rate and government
expenditure paths. However, in this model framework, we can also consider pre-announced economic
events, for example a change in government policy to occur in the future. We can then consider both
the current period impacts of pre-announced changes - i.e. the impact of anticipated events or changes
in policy as well as the subsequent dynamic path. In this case we consider the pre-announcement to
be credible, i.e. agents fully expect the action to take place.
To illustrate the di⁄erence between an pre-announced and shock we consider a temporary increase
in government spending of 0.5% of GDP for 3 years under the two alternative conditions:
￿ pre-announced at time t-8. In this case the change in government policy is pre-announced 2
years before the shock and is fully credible and anticipated. Therefore, forward-looking agents
know that the shock will occur and can already optimise their behaviour in advance.
￿ announced shock occurring at time t, This is similar to the simulations in the previous section
but is only a temporary shock.
In the unanticipated shock there is a jump in prices when the shock takes place as agents re-adjust
their expectations. In the ￿ anticipated/pre-announced￿case agents can react in advance, as they know,
not only the timing, but also the duration and size of the shock. We see that initially prices react
less, as some agents are backward looking. However, interest rates, and exchange rates already start
to react in advance leading to an initial negative e⁄ect on GDP.
10.7 Unannounced (unanticipated) change in policy
In the previous simulations, forward-looking agents anticipate fully the consequences of a shock right
from the start of the announcement, however, this could be viewed as assuming too much information
on behalf of agents. Therefore, we also consider an unannounced and unanticipated changes in policy,
in which agents are continuously surprised. Agents in this case observe the shock, but expect it to
be reversed the next period. This could be due to limited information by agents or because the
change in policy is unannounced or is considered ￿ un-credible￿by agents. In a way, this approach
is consistent with the DSGE practice where shocked variables are expected to follow an estimated
AR structure. However, forward-looking agents are still rational, and expectations are still model-
consistent it is just that agents don￿ t fully know the full sequence of future shocks and are to some
degree, continuously (sequentially) surprised each period. This approach di⁄ers from the previous
simulations, in that agents will have to continuously re-optimize his or her behaviour taking into
account the new information, whereas in the previous cases, the outcome is in line with the optimising
behaviour of forward-looking agents. Clearly, for a one period shock the announced and unannounced
shocks are the same, but divergences occur when the shock lasts over a longer period of time.52
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We consider a three year increase in Government spending of 0.5% of GDP for three years and
thereafter government spending returns to the baseline. The ￿scal rule is in operation and known by
agents. We consider this scenario under three alternative assumptions:
1. announced and credible shock, where at time t the government announces the increase in gov-
ernment spending and the duration. This announcement is credible, so agents adjust their
expectations accordingly;
2. an unannounced (or uncredible) and unanticipated shock to government spending where agents
don￿ t know that government policy has changed so they expect government spending to return
to its previous level each period and
3. an unannounced (or uncredible) and unanticipated shock, where forward-looking agents expect
a Government spending shock to display some persistence but gradually fading out - i.e. agents
assume government spending follows an AR(1) process with a rho parameter of 0.9.
In each case the shock is for 3 years, and expectations are rational in that they are model-consistent.
The only di⁄erence is whether the agents realise the duration of the shock or not. In the ￿rst case
they know the duration as it is announced by the government. In the second and third simulation,
the duration of the shock is unknown so agents make alternative assumptions about the duration.
In these cases the model is solved iteratively as agents re-optimise each period as new information
becomes available.
For simplicity we have done these simulations only for France, and the results are presented at the
end of the paper. Qualitatively, the three simulations have similar reactions: output increases, prices
rise, and interest rates increase due to higher demand and higher prices; but there are quantitative
di⁄erences both in magnitude and timing. Under the announced shock, the initial impact on GDP
is less than the size of the initial shock, as agents anticipate future tax rises. However, under the
unannounced shocks, the initial impact of GDP is around 0.5%. Further out the negative impact
of GDP is larger in the unannounced cases compared to the announced shock. On the price size,
the initial e⁄ects for the unannounced shocks are small, but quickly increase, with the unannounced
AR(1) expectations having the largest impact on prices. Therefore, the reaction of the economy to
identical paths of government spending depends strongly on agents expectation of the duration of the
shock. Under the assumption of a gradual return to previous levels, the rigidities of the model and
the distinction between forward-looking and backward agents becomes apparent. After 20 years all
three simulations are back to base. We explore this issue further in our sister paper (Dieppe et al
2011) where we consider the implication of replacing rational expectations with learning.
11 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a model speci￿ed to track both the short-run dynamics around the
medium-run equilibrium and also the deviations of the medium-run developments from the balanced-
growth-path. The model consists of three optimising private sector decision making units, i.e. ￿rms,
trade unions and households, where output is in the short-run demand determined and monopolis-
tically competing ￿rms set prices and factor demands. Labour is indivisible and monopoly-unions
set wages and households make consumption/saving decisions. In the medium-run the supply-side
has cross-equation restrictions which allows for non-unitary elasticity of substitution between labour
and capital and quite general factor augmenting technical progress. The micro-founded theoretical
coherance of the model addresses the Lucas critique, even though we assume agents knows only the53
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parameters related to her optimization problem but does not need to know the rest of the model,
i.e. a limited information approach. Therefore, the core of the model is estimated with GMM, which
implicitly assumes limited information boundedly rational expectations.
In this paper, indicative simulations are undertaken with agents￿expectations based on rational,
model consistent expectations. These simulations suggest the impluse responses of the model to ex-
ogenous shocks are plausible with cross-country di⁄erences re￿ ecting estimated country heterogeneity.
Furthermore, under our framework, the reaction of the economy to shocks depends strongly on whether
it is pre-announced and anticipated or announced and credible, or unannounced and uncredible.
Previous criticism of backward looking macroeconometric models, have been that real e⁄ects are
too long-lasting. In the new MCM with forward-looking rational expectations, even with some rigidi-
ties, the initial adjustments are quick and there are fast adjustments to equilibrium. This is compa-
rable to many DSGE models, but to some degree the adjustment could be too quick, unless agents
do not know the duration of the shocks, e.g. they suppose it is a series of autocorrelated exogenous
shocks. This is one motivation for considering an alternative expectation process. Indeed, the ratio-
nality assumption used in these scenarios are in some ways extreme: either there is full credibility
or zero credibility and agents are continuously surprised. An alternative, more plausible case is that
credibility is acquired. In a subsequent paper we approach this issue by introducing some learning
mechanisms into the model in our sister paper (Dieppe, Gonzalez Pandiella, Hall and Willman 2011)
and study the impact. In future papers we shall also conduct various simulation exercises to study
the cross-country linkages.
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Instruments DE FR IT ES NL
￿n 2 ￿4 1 ￿4 2 3 2, 3
￿y 1, 3 1 ￿3 4 2 2 ￿4
n*-n 2, 3 1 ￿3 3, 4 2 ￿4 2, 3, 5
(1+￿)(w￿pI)
FN 1, 3 - 6 1, 2, 5, 6 3, 4, 6 3, 4, 6 2, 3, 6
￿(w-pI) 2, 3 1 ￿3 2 ￿4 2 ￿4 3 ￿5, 7
Replacing the time varying discount factor, D, replaced by its sample average gives a simpli￿ed
representation:
FR: nt = 0:4981nt+1 + 0:4968nt￿1 + 0:0051n￿
t
DE: nt = 0:4881nt+1 + 0:4927nt￿1 + 0:0192n￿
t
IT: nt = 0:4840nt+1 + 0:4887nt￿1 + 0:0273n￿
t
ES: nt = 0:4650nt+1 + 0:4688nt￿1 + 0:0662n￿
t




Instruments DE FR IT ES NL
￿k 2, 3 2, 3 2 3 2
INST1 1 1, 2 - - -
INST2 2 1 2 2, 3 2 ￿4
ishort 2 ￿4 1 ￿4 2 ￿4 2, 4 1, 4
ilong 1 ￿5 1 ￿5 1 ￿5 1 ￿5 1, 3, 4, 6
(1+r)￿1 1 1, 2 1 2, 3 2, 3
UC 2, 4 1, 2, 4, 5 2, 4 2, 3 2 ￿4
MPK 1, 2, 4, 6 2, 4, 6 1, 2, 4, 6 1, 2, 4, 6 1, 2, 4, 6
￿pS 1, 3, 4 1, 3 1, 3, 4 1, 3, 4 2
ps-php
s - - - 2 2, 4
￿y 2 1 2 2 2 ￿4
￿x 1, 3 1, 3 1, 3 1, 3 1, 3
Where INST1 and INST2 are the ￿ts of ￿kt+1 and ￿kt+2 with respect to the lagged values of capital
stock, output, GDP de￿ ator, investment de￿ ator, user cost, marginal product of capital and stock
prices. Only lags the t-values of which exceeded one were approved.
Normalising the equation with respect to the current period and replacing the time-varying discount
factor by its sample average gives the following representation:
FR:￿kt = ￿0:1166￿￿kt+2 +0:6181￿￿kt+1 +0:3568￿￿kt￿1 +0:0101￿[MPKt ￿ 0:75 ￿ UCt + 0:0246]
DE:￿kt = ￿0:0911￿￿kt+2 +0:5600￿￿kt+1 +0:4551￿￿kt￿1 +0:0080￿[MPKt ￿ 0:74 ￿ UCt + 0:0329]
IT: ￿kt = ￿0:1160￿￿kt+2 +0:6181￿￿kt+1 +0:4593￿￿kt￿1 +0:0076￿[MPKt ￿ 0:80 ￿ UCt + 0:0271]59
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ES:￿kt = ￿0:1476 ￿ ￿kt+2 + 0:6898 ￿ ￿kt+1 + 0:4310 ￿ ￿kt￿1 + 0:0076 ￿ [MPKt ￿ 0:75 ￿ UCt + 0:0206]
NL:￿kt = ￿0:0617￿￿kt+2 +0:4739￿￿kt+1 +0:4740￿￿kt￿1 +0:0119￿[MPKt ￿ 0:67 ￿ UCt + 0:0206]
A.3 NKPC equation
Lags of Instruments
Instruments FR IT NL DE ES
￿p 2 1 ￿3 2 2 2, 3
p*-p 2, 3 1, 2 2, 3 - -
INSTPV - - - 1, 2, 3 1, 2
n*-n 3, 4 2, 3 2 2 2, 3, 5
ishort 2, 3 1, 5, 6 1 2, 3 1, 2, 7
ilong 3 1, 4, 5 2 3 1, 2, 7
￿w 3 - - - -
1
1+rshort - - - 5 -
￿pM 3 - - 1 2
￿poil - 3, 4 2 ￿4 - 5
Where INSTPV is the ￿t of
(1 ￿ 0:75)(1 ￿ 0:99 ￿ 0:75))





with respect to the lagged values of variables p, p*,n￿ ￿ n, ￿pM, pM, pX, poil, ishort, ilong in the
interval from minus 1 to minus 12. To retain the degrees of freedom su¢ cient only the lags, the
signi￿cance level of which exceeded 5 per cent, were approved.
Normalising the equation with respect to the current period and replacing the time-varying discount
factor by its sample average gives the following representation:
FR: ￿pt = 0:5576 ￿ ￿pt+1 + 0:4354 ￿ ￿pt￿1 + 0:0132 ￿ (p￿
t ￿ pt)
DE: ￿pt = 0:6612 ￿ ￿pt+1 + 0:3346 ￿ ￿pt￿1 + 0:0308 ￿ (p￿
t ￿ pt)
IT: ￿pt = 0:5904 ￿ ￿pt+1 + 0:4064 ￿ ￿pt￿1 + 0:0082 ￿ (p￿
t ￿ pt)
ES: ￿pt = 0:5909 ￿ ￿pt+1 + 0:4050 ￿ ￿pt￿1 + 0:0504 ￿ (p￿
t ￿ pt)
NL: ￿pt = 0:6245 ￿ ￿pt+1 + 0:3735 ￿ ￿pt￿1 + 0:0271 ￿ (p￿
t ￿ pt)
A.4 NKPC wage equation
Lags of Instruments
Instruments DE FR IT ES NL
￿w 2,3,4 2 2, 3 2 2
w￿
uu-w - 1, 2 2 2, 3 1
w￿
nu-w - 2 2, 3 2 1, 3
n*-n 9,12 - 2, 3 3 2
ishort 3,7,10 3 - 6 3, 6
ilong 3,12 3 4 1 1, 8
￿pEI - 1 1 5 2, 3
￿pM - 2, 3 2 - -
￿pX - 2, 3 - - -
INSTPV 2,3 - - - -60
ECB




nu and refer to the optimal frictionless wage rates of the utilitarian and non-utilitarian
unions, respectively, and INSTPV is computed with respect to the lagged variables of w￿
uu;w￿
nu;w, ￿p
and n*-n in the interval from minus 1 to minus 12.
Normalising the equation with respect to the current period and replacing the time-varying discount
factor by its sample average gives the following representation:
FR: ￿wt = 0:5813 ￿ ￿wt+1 + 0:4143 ￿ ￿wt￿1 + 0:0096 ￿ (w￿
t ￿ wt)
DE: ￿wt = 0:63940 ￿ ￿wt+1 + 0:3569 ￿ ￿wt￿1 + 0:0191 ￿ (w￿
t ￿ wt)
IT: ￿wt = 0:5993 ￿ ￿wt+1 + 0:3956 ￿ ￿wt￿1 + 0:0572 ￿ (w￿
t ￿ wt)
ES: ￿wt = 0:5029 ￿ ￿wt+1 + 0:4926 ￿ ￿wt￿1 + 0:0060 ￿ (w￿
t ￿ wt)




Instruments DE FR IT ES NL
￿KII 2 ￿5 2 ￿5 2 ￿5 3, 5 2, 3, 5
￿KII* 2 ￿4 2 ￿4 3 ￿5 3 ￿5 2, 4, 5
￿S 2, 3 2 3 3 3
rshort 2 ￿5 2 ￿5 2 ￿5 2 ￿5 2, 3, 5
n*-n 2 2, 3 3 3 2, 3
A.6 Consumption equation
Lags of Instruments
Instruments DE FR IT ES NL
C
Y 2, 3 3, 4 2 ￿4 2 ￿4 2, 3
(V t￿1
Y )-1 3, 4 1 ￿3 1 ￿3 2, 3 1, 2
rshort 2, 4 - 6 4 ￿8 3, 5, 7 4 ￿8 4 ￿7
rlong 2, 4 2 ￿4 2 ￿4 2 ￿4 2 ￿4
URX 4 - 4 2 ￿4
￿4URX 2, 3 2, 3 - -
PS
PI 2, 3, 6 - 6 6 2
PH
PI 2 - - 2, 3 3
PI
PC 2 - 3 - 1
KHR
KPR - - - 1 -61
ECB




































































































































































































































































































































Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
Inﬂation is computed as year-on-year rate of change.62
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Figure 7: Announced and pre−announced shock 
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Figure 8: Credibly Announced and unannounced / uncredible shock 






















Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
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